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ON THE NATURE OF BANKRUPTCY: AN ESSAY
ON BANKRUPTCY SHARING AND THE
CREDITORS' BARGAIN
Thomas H. Jackson* and Robert E. Scott"
F INANCE theorists have long recognized that bankruptcy is a key com-
ponent in any general theory of the capital structure of business entities.
Legal theorists have been similarly sensitive to the substantial allocational
and distributional effects of the bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, until
recently, underlying justifications for the bankruptcy process have not been
widely studied. Bankruptcy scholars have been content to recite, without
critical analysis, the two normative objectives of bankruptcy: rehabilitation
of overburdened debtors and equality of treatment for creditors and other
claimants.
The developing academic interest in legal theory has spurred a corre-
sponding interest in expanding the theoretical foundations of bankruptcy
law as well. One of us has developed over the past several years a conceptual
paradigm, based on a hypothetical bargain among creditors, as a normative
criterion for evaluating the bankruptcy system.' The cornerstone of the
creditors' bargain is the normative claim that prebankruptcy entitlements
should be impaired in bankruptcy only when necessary to maximize net
asset distributions to the creditors as a group and never to accomplish purely
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I See T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986); Jackson, Translating
Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. Legal Stud. 73 (1985); Jackson,
Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (1984); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
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distributional goals.2
The strength of the creditors' bargain conceptualization is also its limita-
tion. The hypothetical bargain metaphor focuses on the key bankruptcy
objective of maximizing the welfare of the group through collectivization.
This single-minded focus on maximizing group welfare helps to identify the
underlying patterns in what appear to be unrelated aspects of the bankruptcy
process. It also implies that other normative goals should be seen as compet-
ing costs of the collectivization process. Yet this claim uncovers a further
puzzle. Despite the centrality of the maximization norm, persistent and sys-
tematic redistributional impulses are apparent in bankruptcy. Is redistribu-
tion in bankruptcy simply attributable to random errors or misperceptions
by courts and legislators? Or are other forces present in the bankruptcy
process as well?
In this Article we undertake to examine the "other forces" that may be at
work in bankruptcy.' Many bankruptcy rules require sharing of assets with
other creditors, shareholders, and third parties. Too often these distribu-
tional effects are grouped together under general references to equity, wealth
redistribution, or appeals to communitarian values. These labels are
unhelpful. They disguise the fact, for instance, that the justification and
impact of consensual risk sharing among creditors is entirely different in
character from the rationale for using bankruptcy to redistribute wealth to
nonconsensual third parties. Understanding these diverse effects requires,
therefore, a method of discriminating among the different motivations that
impel redistributions in bankruptcy.
In Part I, we reconstruct and embellish the original creditors' bargain
model by relaxing several of the implicit assumptions underlying the ex ante
bargain. Within this framework, we examine more precisely the contours of
2 One of the touchstones of this model is that, while a collective regime such as bankruptcy
is sometimes necessary as a device to induce cooperative behavior, redistribution in the
collective regime only induces self-interested action by particular claimants that may be
inconsistent with the interests of the claimants as a group. This model seeks to ensure that
distributional concerns do not interfere with the central goal of maximizing the deployment of
assets to all claimants. One method of accomplishing this objective is to minimize the
distinctions in treatment of individual claimants between the two debt-collection regimes.
3 We put aside financial "fresh start" notions that often are preeminently relevant for
individuals who seek bankruptcy to discharge past debts. The fresh start norm insulates future
income (and certain other assets) from the claims of past indebtedness. This policy, which
requires sharing certain assets with the "debtor," has no relevance (except sometimes
rhetorically) for corporate debtors. Corporate debtors get no discharge in ordinary
bankruptcy proceedings, see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982), and the "discharge" in Chapter 11,
11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), is best seen as consummating the "swap" of old
claims for new claims that occurs in a reorganization. We do not address in this Article the
fresh start policy for individuals in bankruptcy.
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the original creditors' bargain to see if any purportedly redistributional con-
cerns of bankruptcy law reflect a part of the ex ante agreement. To the
extent that they do, it is then incorrect to say as a matter of theory that there
is a conflict between bankruptcy's distributional goals and the creditors'
bargain.
This expanded framework illuminates an important distributional princi-
ple that underlies a richer version of the creditors' bargain. Under this prin-
ciple, all participants share (at least in part) the risks of business failure
attributable to certain "common disasters." We argue that those distribu-
tional effects premised on the anticipation of these common disasters would
be explicitly included in an ex ante bargain, so long as the costs of implemen-
tation did not outweigh the benefits in enhancing the creditors' wealth.4
In Part II, we examine whether an expanded framework that incorporates
a common disaster component to business failure helps to explain at least
some of the various distributional effects commonly observed in bankruptcy.
We test the model against three features of the bankruptcy process: (1) the
extraordinary powers of collection and enhancement of the estate afforded
the bankruptcy trustee; (2) the imposition of "delay" costs on secured credi-
tors during the bankruptcy process; and (3) the implementation of Chapter
11 reorganization plans. We conclude from this analysis that the common
disaster conception both enriches and supports the heuristic value of the ex
ante bargain. Indeed, the expanded bargain model rationalizes a number of
the apparent anomalies that heretofore have eroded the explanatory power
of the original creditors' bargain conception. At least in theory, the
expanded model accounts for many of the distributional effects that appear
regularly throughout the bankruptcy process.
The theoretical appeal of the expanded model is dampened, however, by
its significant limitations once implementation costs are reintroduced.
Except for across-the-board provisions such as the denial of postpetition
interest to secured creditors, the impulse for redistribution in bankruptcy
seems to founder on an inability of the system to distinguish between favored
and disfavored distributions. Indeed, the problem is basic. Absent a refined
selection mechanism that permits such distinctions, distributional considera-
tions that differ from those used outside of bankruptcy will inevitably impair
the realization of bankruptcy's collective goals.
We conclude, therefore, that to the extent that the bankruptcy process
embraces diverse distributional goals, it inevitably generates significant off-
4 This common disaster conceptualization was first suggested in Scott, A Relational Theory
of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 967-68 (1986) [hereinafter Scott, Relational
Theory], and further developed in Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain
Heuristic, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 690, 700-07 (1986) [hereinafter Scott, Through Bankruptcy].
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setting costs, even when those goals are consistent with implementing a com-
mon disaster component in the ex ante bargain. These costs result both from
the perverse incentives resulting from a different ordering of entitlements
inside and outside of bankruptcy, and from the inherent incapacity of the
legal system to specify ex ante rules for implementing ex post distributional
principles. Whether the benefits of reflecting the expanded bargain model in
the rules of bankruptcy are worth the implementation costs ultimately is an
empirical question. That the tradeoff exists, however, invites renewed atten-
tion as well to the question of selection rules that aid in distinguishing the
uses of bankruptcy that further the ex ante bargain from those that further
the interests of only one group, at the expense of the whole.
I. AN EXPANDED MODEL OF THE CREDITORS' BARGAIN
A. Reconstructing the Creditors' Bargain
1. Background Assumptions and Starting Points5
A primary objective of any bankruptcy process is to regulate the inherent
conflicts among different groups having separate claims against a debtor's
assets and income stream. Although many classes of claimants may exist,
the most common corporate structure usually consists of secured creditors,
unsecured creditors, and equity (common stockholders). The relations
among classes are governed both by contracts and by legal rules prescribing
attributes of the various classes. We focus here on the case of default and
insolvency, for the interclass conflicts generated by such a state of the world
pose particular problems.
Because lower classes (equity interests and often general creditors) fare so
poorly in any liquidation that follows insolvency, they are likely to want the
debtor to continue in business. Cash-outs collapse probability distributions
and thus are unattractive to the residual interests that benefit from upside
potential. This is almost certainly the case with equity owners, whose inter-
ests are worth something if the debtor continues but are, by definition,
5 There are several ways to examine complex phenomena such as bankruptcy. One method
is to develop a conceptual model with a clear normative perspective and to consider whether
the bankruptcy process either reflects or deviates from the stated norm. An alternative
approach is to attempt a positive analysis of the bankruptcy process, using a descriptive or
explanatory model. One of us has already undertaken a major project of the first sort. We
now search for the additional insights available through a process that begins with the second
method and then returns to the conceptual model to suggest improvements to it. See T.
Jackson, supra note 1. Thus, our objective is to provide a richer normative theory of the
bankruptcy process by enhancing the explanatory power of the original model. Obviously, as
with all analytic tools, the distinction between these two approaches is not as clean as their
several adherents would assert. This should not surprise anyone who subscribes to the view
that persistent social institutions rest on purposive foundations.
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worthless in the liquidation of an insolvent company. Accordingly, at least
one class, and perhaps others, will expect to realize more from its claims if
an insolvent debtor is given a chance to recover than if the debtor is
promptly liquidated.6 These classes frequently (and sometimes successfully)
use legal mechanisms to forestall the liquidation of business debtors. On the
other hand, creditors whose claims are well protected by security interests
generally prefer the certain return from a prompt foreclosure. After all, the
business position of an insolvent debtor can deteriorate as well as improve,
and if it does deteriorate, fewer assets may remain for secured parties. While
contract terms such as adjustable interest rates can compensate secured
creditors ex post for some of these risks, the rates are likely to be adjusted
too little, too late.
Reconciling the tensions among the individual interests of claimants of an
insolvent debtor poses an obvious problem, one unlikely to be resolved col-
lectively without legal intervention. Furthermore, because the interests of
various classes differ, it is unclear who should hold the decisionmaking
power once collective action begins. The problem of transferring decision-
making power from the equity owners (who normally hold it subject to cer-
tain contractual and legal restrictions) is compounded by the associated
problem that no other class may sufficiently reflect the interests of the claim-
ants taken as a whole. Thus, the objective of the collective is never entirely
congruent with the objective of any of the constituent parts.
Even after collective action begins, the choice between liquidation and
rehabilitation will often be difficult. If the going concern value of the firm
exceeds its liquidation value, then the debtor's claimants as a group would
prefer not to have the firm liquidated but rather would prefer to have the
business sold as a debt-free entity.7 Indeed, if the debtor's long-term pros-
pects were sufficiently bright, the claimants would prefer to delay collection
altogether and allow the debtor to recover. Going concern value does not
exceed liquidation value in all cases, however. The assumption of greater
going concern valuedepends upon the existence of two factors: the debtor's
assets must be worth more in combination than if they were broken up and
sold, and the long-term prospects of the debtor must be brighter than the
short-term prospects. In cases where either of these factors does not hold,
total group welfare would be enhanced by a prompt liquidation of the
6 Insolvency and bankruptcy do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. A firm may not be
insolvent, yet may have creditors act as if it is because of a high enough probability that it will
be insolvent. For example, a firm that owes $100 and has a 50% chance of being worth $200
in a year's time and a 50% chance of being worth $50 then, has an expected value of $125--
more than liabilities. Yet, the creditors may well act as if the firm were insolvent.
7 This discussion of the choice between going concern and liquidation value puts aside tax
considerations, which are important factors in many real-world cases.
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debtor, as opposed to a collective proceeding in which some interests might
gain greater shares at the expense of others.
A principal justification for bankruptcy law, then, is to provide incentives
for individual claimants such that each of them, as well as constituent
groups, finds it optimal either to wait or to collect immediately, depending
on the underlying empirical realities and on the interests of the claimants as
a whole. Whichever course the law encourages parties to take, maximizing
the total welfare of the group will necessarily be the central objective. The
dilemma, however, is that the law cannot ensure that the interests of any
particular group of claimants will coincide with this interest of the whole.
Thus, allocation of decisionmaking power in bankruptcy is likely to be diffi-
cult and to reflect only imperfectly the group goal, even if that group goal is
easy to articulate.
2. The Bargain Redux
In seeking to understand how bankruptcy law implements a general objec-
tive of maximizing group welfare, one can usefully imagine "bankruptcy as a
system designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to
form among themselves were they to negotiate such an agreement from an
ex ante position."' A central premise underlying this creditors' bargain con-
ceptualization is that a system of state law entitlements (including priorities
among secured and unsecured creditors) is already in place and that parties
know what their priority positions will be so long as state law continues to
govern their rights. Given these background conditions, the question is
whether the parties would nevertheless agree to a collective scheme of distri-
bution, and, if so, what form would it take? If we assume that commercial
parties are rational and self-interested, this hypothetical bargain analysis
provides indirect evidence of what real world parties would, in fact, agree to.
The hypothetical bargain thus yields a normative criterion, grounded on
principles of autonomy, for evaluating the legitimacy of the bankruptcy
process.
The creditors come to the bargain, then, with their individual state law
entitlements intact. It is logical, therefore, to begin by assuming that insol-
vency is a foreseeable risk-one that will be borne individually by the vari-
ous claimants. The calculation of this risk will have influenced individual
creditors' decisions as to whether a security interest should be taken and, if
so, on what terms. This assumption suggests that the agreement hammered
out in the creditors' bargain would respect those prebankruptcy entitle-
8 Jackson, Creditors' Bargain, supra note 1, at 860. A similar conceptualization is
developed in Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1987, at
173.
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ments, even when it is in the interest of the group to move from an individ-
ual to a collective regime such as bankruptcy. Secured creditors, for
example, would have paid for their priority position by accepting a lower
rate of return and should therefore be allowed to retain the benefits of their
initial bargain by receiving an equivalent value for their collateral in bank-
ruptcy. Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, would have obtained a
higher interest rate by forgoing security and in so doing would have assumed
a greater risk that their claims would not be fully satisfied upon default and
subsequent bankruptcy. The participants in the bankruptcy bargain could
thus be expected to honor this relationship by maintaining the secured credi-
tors' nonbankruptcy entitlements and by preventing redistribution in bank-
ruptcy from secured creditors to unsecured creditors and the debtor.9
This basic argument is supported by two further observations. First,
unless the rules regulating bankruptcy access were perfectly drawn, the rec-
ognition that bankruptcy provides a method of distributing entitlements that
differs from state law would create incentives that would motivate parties to
use the bankruptcy process strategically. 10 Unsecured creditors and equity
owners would opt for bankruptcy when their share of the bankruptcy estate
exceeded the value of their entitlements under state law. These actions
would be undesirable whenever the expectation of a greater share stemmed
solely from the claimant's ability to use the bankruptcy process strategically
to delay liquidation." Secured creditors, on the other hand, would prefer
nonbankruptcy law if bankruptcy would force them to share their state law
entitlements. Furthermore, once the ex ante bargain is struck, individual
claimants would thereafter bargain in the shadow of both nonbankruptcy
and bankruptcy law, exploiting provisions unfavorable to the opposing side
as a means of obtaining a favorable readjustment of their bargained-for enti-
9 Scott, Through Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 694-95.
10 The problem of perverse incentives and the relationship between bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy law is thoughtfully analyzed in Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28
UCLA L. Rev. 953 (1981), and Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy Power, 26
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 3 (1975). This problem is also the focus of the United States Supreme
Court's choice of an appropriate "gap-filling" rule in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48
(1979) (party in federal bankruptcy court should be afforded the same protection that would
have been granted under state law had bankruptcy not ensued).
1 Cases that are essentially two-party disputes (between equity owners and a dominant
creditor) are generally thought to be inappropriate for bankruptcy. See, e.g., Little Creek Dev.
Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir.
1986); Meadowbrook Investors' Group v. Thirtieth Place, Inc. (In re Thirtieth Place, Inc.), 30
Bankr. 503 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). But cf. In re Cordova, 34 Bankr. 70 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983)
(single-creditor involuntary bankruptcy appropriate because bankruptcy process could sell
ongoing business better than the court).
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tlements.12 As parties maneuver strategically to obtain the most favorable
individual outcome, they generate unnecessary social costs, including a
costly enforcement structure and a narrowing of the distinctions among dif-
ferent classes of claimants.1 3
The second reason to believe that the parties to an ex ante bargain would
preserve prebankruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy is that secured creditors
would otherwise be unwilling to join in a bankruptcy process from which
they derive no advantage. Mandatory inclusion of secured creditors is neces-
sary for unsecured creditors and those junior to them to enjoy the fruits of
collective action. Only by agreeing to such a collectivization process can the
claimants solve the anticipated problems of noncooperation and ensure an
increased pool of assets for distribution to all creditors.
3. The Problem of Distributional Effects
This simple creditors' bargain conception focuses on maximizing group
welfare through collectivization. It is concerned with distribution only inso-
far as bankruptcy distributions either undermine the sharing rules of the ex
ante bargain or promote inefficiencies through strategic forum shopping.
Yet the distinction between maximization of group welfare and distribution
within the group is not so clear. Any collectivization procedure necessarily
has both a redistributive and an allocative effect. In order to implement a
collective system of distribution, individual creditors must be restrained
from exercising entitlements that they would otherwise enjoy under state
law. There will obviously be an interference with prebankruptcy rights;
there will also, however, almost inevitably be a change in the relative value of
those prebankruptcy rights. It is too costly to determine and respect relative
12 Scott, Through Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 695; see Note, The Proper Discount Rate
Under the Chapter 11 Cramdown Provision: Should Secured Creditors Retain Their State Law
Entitlements?, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1499, 1502 (1986). Under this view, of course, rule changes that
are favorable to senior classes are equally as undesirable as rule changes favorable to junior
classes. See Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of
Security, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 931 (1985).
13 One can best visualize this dilution, and its effect on differentiated capital structures, by
examining the extreme: the case where bankruptcy is freely available and the distribution rule
in bankruptcy is a strict pro rata sharing rule. In those cases, unless accurate sorting
mechanisms could be devised, one would expect the priority distinctions between secured and
unsecured debt largely to disappear, leaving as the sole advantage of secured debt the two-
party default rights (such as self-help repossession). Such a regime would conflict with any
starting point that recognized efficiencies in the taking of secured credit in the first place. And
if there were no such efficiencies, the simple solution would be to bar secured credit instead of
establishing a second forum for debt collection that plays by different distributional rules. See
Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143,
1147-49 (1979); Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 4, at 925-33, 969-70.
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values in full in a collective proceeding.14 Compromises are inevitable in
order to preserve the efficiencies of the collective regime. If those distribu-
tional effects are tolerated because they promote the central objective of
maximizing group welfare, it is appropriate to ask whether other distribu-
tional effects might be similarly understood.
By excluding such a distributional analysis, the simple maximization per-
spective treats as indistinguishable-and equally undesirable-the various
distributional effects that are unambiguously present in bankruptcy.15 It is
obvious, however, that not all bankruptcy distributions are alike. The redis-
tribution that we observe in bankruptcy cases may be caused by several con-
ceptually distinct factors. Indeed, a complete typology of the possible
motivations for bankruptcy redistribution would include at least seven dis-
crete categories: (1) "equitable" redistributions by bankruptcy courts; (2)
errors and misperceptions owing to imperfections in legal rules; (3) "unprin-
cipled" redistributions resulting from the strategic manipulation of the bank-
rulitcy process; (4) consensual risk sharing among creditors; (5)
contribution among creditors to reduce "eve of bankruptcy" conflicts of
interest; (6) redistributions to preserve the "ownership" interest of certain
equity interests; and (7) redistributions to benefit nonconsensual claimants
and other third parties.
The uncertain genesis of particular bankruptcy redistributions means that
broad generalizations about the costs and benefits of redistribution in bank-
ruptcy are virtually meaningless. A more fruitful approach is to assess the
effects of particular redistributions given certain plausible assumptions. The
issue then becomes whether any bankruptcy redistributions can be seen as
the means of implementing, rather than undermining, the original distribu-
tion implicit in the ex ante bargain.1 6 We begin by reconsidering several
14 The same point applies to rules that decide when bankruptcy is appropriate and who
makes the relevant decisions once in bankruptcy.
15 The problem of strategic forum shopping is the major impediment to selecting any
desired set of distributional rules in bankruptcy. Therefore, if the rules governing access to
bankruptcy appropriately screened just for cases presenting collective action problems and
could be easily applied, any set of distributional rules in bankruptcy could be adopted. For
example, one could have a set of rules under which all creditors shared equally. The only
impact of that rule would be to erode the distinctions among classes of creditors. For a debate
over bankruptcy policy focusing on the extent to which forum shopping is a real or only a
perceived impediment to broader distributional analysis, see Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1987); Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815 (1987).
16 The purpose of this inquiry is to develop a richer normative justification for the
bankruptcy process. If maximization and redistribution are, in fact, complementary goals, the
more coherent are the core normative premises of the bankruptcy process. Furthermore, if
both collectivization and distribution can be seen, at least in theory, as the product of an ex
ante bargain, this supports the claim that the rules are fair. Thus, the theoretical argument has
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basic assumptions of the original creditors' bargain model to see if they hold
a key to the puzzle of redistribution in bankruptcy.
B. Bankruptcy Sharing and the Common Disaster
A central premise of the simple creditors' bargain is that redistribution in
bankruptcy is inconsistent with the maximizing objectives of the collective.
Insolvency is seen as a foreseeable risk that is borne individually by the vari-
ous claimants of any business enterprise. Thus, the model assumes, inter
alia, that none of the risks of business failure will be shared among claimants
of different classes, except as otherwise explicitly agreed. 7
As a starting point for reexamination, we focus critically on this assump-
tion. Consider the possibility that the bankruptcy process reflects a norma-
tively satisfactory accommodation between the objective of asset
maximization and a complementary distributional norm: that all partici-
pants should share (at least in part) in the "common" risks of business fail-
ure. Common risks include those contingencies whose probabilities or
effects cannot be influenced by the actions of individual parties, contingen-
cies that are, in consequence, common to the affected group of claimants.
Common risks are thus distinct from the individual or particular risks of
business failure that can be attributed to a single group, such as risks arising
out of incompetent or dishonest management for which the shareholders as a
group are "responsible." Perhaps certain redistributions in bankruptcy can
be understood as a response to the effects of such common disasters on busi-
ness enterprises.
1. Allocating Insolvency Risks Under Uncertainty
a Strategies for Reducing Insolvency Risks
The risks of business failure do not all arise from the same source, nor
would claimants necessarily treat all of them in the same way. Some risks of
insolvency arise from contingencies whose probabilities or effects can be
influenced by the actions of particular parties or groups. In these cases, one
party or another can act in a way that will alter the objective amount of risk
that is created. When such precautionary actions are cost-beneficial, all par-
ties will gain from agreement on a binary strategy of risk control: assigning
the entire risk of a particular contingency to the party (or group) best able to
influence the amount of the risk. Shareholders, for example, are assigned the
value independent of the extent to which these two norms can be successfully accommodated
in any real-world bankruptcy system.
17 From this assumption it follows that a collective proceeding associated with insolvency
exists to solve collective action problems only, and not to readjust who bears what risks. Seen
in that light, redistributions indeed seem counterproductive and normatively undesirable.
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insolvency risks arising from defalcations or incompetence of the firm's man-
agers because they are best able to monitor the managers' performance. If
bankruptcy claimants used a strategy of risk control, they would agree that
all the risks of business failure would be borne individually. 18
The advantage of bearing insolvency risks individually derives from the
ability of each creditor to exercise some control over its own relationship
with the debtor. Individual creditors may wish to monitor the debtor's
behavior in different ways or to invest varying amounts in precautionary
activities, so as to best reduce the risks that the debtor will not repay the
loan or diligently pursue the financial prospect. Individual claimants will
cost out these risks by arranging for an optimal combination of price and
security.
Individualized risk bearing will predictably result in a mix of debt and
equity, secured and unsecured credit. This variety will clearly be desirable
for a wide range of business risks. There is substantial evidence that, in
certain classes of transactions, secured credit functions as a unique contrac-
tual mechanism for controlling the conflicts of interest that otherwise hinder
the development of business prospects that are financed by private debt.1 9
Individually borne risk allocations thus enable debtors to obtain the mix of
secured and unsecured debt that best controls debtor-creditor conflict.
Under some circumstances, parties to a creditors' bargain might also be
motivated to pursue a complementary strategy: transferring risks to others
who have greater tolerance for the consequences of a risk. This strategy of
risk transfer would be sensible if various creditors attached different subjec-
tive values to the same risk. If the creditors had different preferences for
risk, then a risk would best be borne by whichever creditor placed the lowest
money cost on it. Risk transfer thus reduces risk cost whenever a risk is
allocated to a party who, if only for psychological reasons, attaches a lower
money value to the risk.20
Risk control and risk transfer are complementary, binary strategies that
reduce risk by allocating the entire risk to individual parties. As such, these
binary strategies fit comfortably into the original creditors' bargain concep-
tion. All of the claimants would presumably agree on a series of hierarchical
priority rules to implement a scheme of individual risk assignments. Not all
risks, however, are best borne by one group as opposed to another. Allocat-
18 The discussion of risk control, as well as the risk-bearing alternatives that are analyzed
below, follows the discussion in Scott, ctonffict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75
Calif. L. Rev. 2005, 2012-18 (1987).
19 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 13; Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L.J. 49 (1982); Scott, Relational Theory, supra
note 4.
20 Scott, supra note 18, at 2014.
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ing the risks of insolvency is considerably more complex if the parties also
consider alternative, noncomplementary strategies. One possibility is risk
sharing. By sharing the risk of events that are not especially in the control of
one party or another, the parties can reduce the amount of uncertainty and
thus potentially reduce the cost of the risk for some if not for all.21 Those
claimants who are risk averse will benefit from a risk-sharing arrangement
because it reduces the variance in risk; each party has a higher probability of
incurring a smaller loss.22
Risk-sharing agreements, however, are costly to negotiate ex ante, because
the parties must settle vexing distributional questions. Moreover, the cost of
measuring and dividing the product of the creditors' bargain will be higher
under a risk-sharing scheme. In general, the more complex the "contractual
product," the more challenging are the problems of measurement and divi-
sion of responsibility.23 By contrast, individualized risk-bearing strategies
are easier to adopt because they depend on relatively simple cognitive heuris-
tics such as the assumption that each party can exercise some control over
the endogenous variables that influence business risks. Because risk-sharing
arrangements are inevitably more complex than a scheme of individual
responsibility, evasion of the collective responsibility is more difficult to
detect and to police. Consequently, the costs of enforcement are higher
where the parties agree to share risks than where the parties bear their
responsibilities individually.
The anticipated costs of risk sharing might suggest that such agreementg
inevitably would be vetoed by the participants in the ex ante bargain. But
the creditors' bargain of necessity involves long-term relationships in which
many of the contingencies that influence business prospects are uncertain
and highly. interactive. In the case of such common risks, no single claimant
can influence the relative probabilities of the possible outcomes or predict
the relationship among them. The relative desirability of any given precau-
tionary action (such as the best means of guarding against particular types of
misbehavior by the debtor) will thus depend upon several interactive vari-
ables (such as what other creditors are also extending credit to the debtor
and on what terms). Under these conditions, increased precautions by indi-
vidual creditors will not return any systematic benefits. The parties to such
21 In Part I.B.2, see infra text accompanying notes 31-38, we explore admiralty law's
general average contribution rule as an analogous method of imposing risk sharing in the face
of common disasters. The analogy is equally suitable here.
22 A risk-averse party will discount a prospect's expected value in order to reflect dislike of
the magnitude of the risk. Scott, supra note 18, at 2015.
23 See Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual
Arrangements, 12 J.L. & Econ. 23 (1969); Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the
California Gold Rush, 20 J.L. & Econ. 421 (1977).
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complex relationships simply cannot realize their collective desire to mini-
mize costs by relying exclusively on individual risk-bearing strategies.
One strong implication follows from this analysis. We might well predict,
contrary to the assumptions of the simple creditors' bargain model, that par-
ties to a creditor's bargain would adopt a mixed strategy for bearing risk.
Individualized strategies designed to reduce risk would generally be pre-
ferred, but some form of risk sharing would be adopted for those common
perils that are too uncertain and interactive to make individual action
meaningful.2"
b. Risk Sharing as a Means of Diversifying Common Risks
The assumption that creditors in an ex ante bargain might well include a
risk-sharing component in their distribution scheme complicates, to some
extent, the claim that the value of nonbankruptcy entitlements should be
fully respected. Under a risk-sharing scheme, the theoretically optimal pri-
ority relationship among various classes of claimants would not necessarily
be simple and linear (A has priority over B), but rather would depend on the
kind of risk that produced the business failure. Indeed, if default or insol-
vency could be causally linked to a common disaster, a pro rata sharing rule
would be the optimal arrangement. Thus, it can no longer be fairly assumed
that the ex ante bargain would grant secured creditors 100% of the value of
their security in bankruptcy, for such an outcome assumes a binary risk
assignment. Moreover, it can no longer be assumed that unsecured creditors
were paid to assume all of the risks of business failure in the initial extension
of credit. This, too, assumes a binary risk assignment. Given that, it is sig-
nificantly harder to determine which distributive results in bankruptcy con-
flict with the ex ante bargain and which distributive results actually
implement it.
It is one thing to assert that risk sharing might well be on the agenda at
the creditors' bargain. It is quite another to be able to predict what form the
sharing arrangement would take. Putting aside the important implementa-
tion problems, however, consider the following story. Begin by visualizing
the risk-sharing agreement between secured and unsecured creditors as a
form of prepaid insurance in which secured creditors would be paid in
advance to potentially share a part of their assets in the future.25 Secured
creditors would agree that whenever insolvency is triggered by common
24 See Scott, supra note 18, at 2018.
25 This sharing agreement is the same, in principle, as any other contractual arrangement,
such as a best efforts contract, in which a principal pays an agent in advance to look out for the
principal's interests in the future. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981).
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risks (interrelated technological events with unpredictable effects) they
would share with unsecured creditors and equity some of the asset pool
otherwise reserved to them. Such an arrangement would provide a method
of diversification for those risks that cannot be successfully reduced by indi-
vidualized risk bearing.
To be sure, the bargaining creditors could choose instead to diversify
"internally" by extending credit with different degrees of risk to a number of
debtors, thus building a risk-neutral portfolio. At least in theory, however,
an "external" diversification, as represented by a risk-sharing scheme, may
be a better means of diversification and thus may provide an optimal
arrangement for some participants in the creditors' bargain. This argument
seems particularly applicable to trade creditors and other unsecured claim-
ants who may otherwise have limited opportunities to diversify.26
Once implementation costs are reintroduced into the analysis, the ques-
tion recurs: How would the parties structure a risk-sharing scheme within
the constraints of a broader system of individual risk bearing? Here again
the relationship between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy responses to busi-
ness failure comes into sharper focus. Risk-sharing impulses are not peculiar
to bankruptcy, but they may well be impossible to implement outside of
bankruptcy. There are formidable operational difficulties in distinguishing
common risks from those that have been assigned to individual claimants.
An attempt to do so on a case-by-case basis, whether inside or outside of
bankruptcy, is likely to be excessively cumbersome. Thus, the absence of
contractual mechanisms to do this sorting does not imply that the sorting is
undesirable as a matter of theory. A prepaid insurance scheme that effects a
partial across the board reduction in the returns to secured creditors may be
the only feasible implementation option. As long as the parties to the credi-
tors' bargain are repeat players, such an insurance device is a simple form of
risk spreading more efficient than a case-by-case attempt to distinguish
between contingencies that trigger either individualized or risk-sharing
arrangements.
26 It is tempting to argue that diversification through risk sharing is implausible where the
claimants are repeat players because, in that context, the creditors would seem ideally suited
for portfolio (or internal) diversification. To the contrary, however, the fact that claimants
such as the trade creditors are repeat players does not alter a more powerful fact: trade
creditors are likely to be heavily concentrated in particular industries (suppliers of lumber, for
example) and are relatively incapable of adjusting for common risks affecting the industry by
diversifying among different kinds of debtors or by altering risk with security arrangements.
As long as a significant group of the participants in the ex ante bargain are thus rendered risk
averse, a risk-sharing scheme will be a plausible strategy, even where other claimants are fully
diversified and risk neutral. The risk-averse creditors will pay the others a premium for the
privilege of diversification through risk sharing.
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From this follows an important point about bankruptcy's distributional
rules. The fact that bankruptcy's distributional rules are distinct from those
outside of bankruptcy does not justify the conclusion that bankruptcy's col-
lective regime violates the creditors' bargain. Of course, neither does it fol-
low that all "equal sharing" rules can be justified in bankruptcy either. If
the collective proceeding deviates from the outcome that would occur
outside of bankruptcy, we must ask why the nonbankruptcy distributional
system did not adopt that risk-sharing outcome as well and how the sorting
among common and particular risks will be done in bankruptcy. We con-
sider several of these questions later in this Article. For now, we simply
make the point that an expanded creditors' bargain that takes account of the
distinct nature of common risks can accommodate distributional changes in
a collective proceeding such as bankruptcy.
2. Eve of Bankruptcy Conflicts of Interest
The problem of perverse incentives (or forum shopping) provides a power-
ful argument for preserving the value of prebankruptcy entitlements in bank-
ruptcy. It is important to remember, however, that perverse incentives are
an inevitable consequence of any bankruptcy process. Any collectivizing
procedure, even one that dismisses the risk-sharing point just explored, inev-
itably alters the prebankruptcy entitlements of individual participants. Pro
rata sharing among general creditors, for example, is at best a crude approxi-
mation of relative values outside of bankruptcy. Even such a relatively
uncontroversial rule ignores the fact that some claimants may be better able
to collect than others. Parties who anticipate losing the right to pursue
individual methods of collection will, in turn, be motivated to pursue
nonmaximizing objectives prior to bankruptcy.
Thus, any collectivization process generates inevitable conflicts of interest
among claimants.2 7 These conflicts are especially severe on the eve.of bank-
ruptcy. As the risk of business failure increases, an individual creditor is
27 Indeed, wholly apart from collectivization concerns, default rights themselves trigger
conflicts of interest among claimants. An enterprise worth $80 if sold and converted to cash
today, but with a 50% chance of being worth $150 and a 50% chance of being worth $50 in a
year's time faces a conflict of interest as between a creditor owed $90 and an equity owner.
Renegotiation will be necessary to preserve the going concern surplus of this company. Such
conflicts exist because claimants with different priority claims to the assets have different
perceptions of what to do with the assets. Any separation of decisionmaking power from the
returns generated by that decision introduces this conflict, as a large body of agency literature
demonstrates. See, e.g., A. Berle & G. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property
(1932); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980);
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business
Behavior, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 1032 (1963).
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motivated to coerce the debtor to pay a greater share of its claim than that
creditor would be able to recover in bankruptcy. This familiar problem
underlies the preference rules of bankruptcy. By requiring creditors to dis-
gorge payments received shortly befoie bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code
reduces the incentives of creditors to engage in a mutually destructive race
for the assets.28
As we will show, however, preference law is a necessary, but not a suffi-
cient, condition for controlling eve of bankruptcy conflicts of interest. An
additional conflict arises as a product of a general agency problem: those
who have some control over a debtor's decisionmaking will have an incen-
tive to make decisions that favor them, even if those decisions are harmful to
the interests of the claimants as a group. Fraudulent conveyance law, along
with a number of other legal rules, responds to the well-understood
problems of inappropriate self-interested behavior by managers and equity.
The problem appears again in the bankruptcy timing decision. As previ-
ously noted, residual owners (such as equity) are likely to respond to insol-
vency by using delay tactics, even though delay may not be in the interest of
the claimants as a group. One of bankruptcy's more vexing problems-
ensuring that bankruptcy proceedings start at the right time-arises out of
this conflict.
A more subtle form of self-interested behavior will occur among certain
classes of secured creditors. These creditors, by contract, may have signifi-
cant control over the decisionmaking apparatus of a firm teetering on insol-
vency. Here, the strategic behavior of secured creditors exercising control in
the prebankruptcy period is to be distinguished from the destructive pursuit
of individual interest once insolvency occurs. This problem of pre-insol-
vency strategic behavior is peculiarly acute in the case of small business
debtors who are heavily dependent on general financing creditors with wrap-
around security interests. These "relational" creditors have substantial lev-
erage and thus de facto control over the business affairs of the debtor; they
can (and do) influence the debtor's business decisions during the crucial
period prior to insolvency and bankruptcy.29
From the perspective of the creditors as a group, it would be in the inter-
est of all claimants that a relational creditor encourage only those financing
and operational decisions that will maximize the expected value of the enter-
28 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing, inter alia, that payments made to a
creditor within 90 days of bankruptcy by an insolvent debtor that enable the creditor to collect
more than it would have collected in a liquidation proceeding are voidable by the trustee as a
preference). Although the objectives of preference law are clear, there is debate over whether
§ 547 as drafted advances them. See McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An
Expression of Doubt, 67 Va. L. Rev. 249 (1981).
29 Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 4, at 916-22, 925-33, 944-52.
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prise. Given the inevitable distributional effects of bankruptcy, however, the
relational creditor is motivated to solidify its priority position on the eve of
bankruptcy, even if the resulting advantage operates to reduce the pool of
assets available for general distribution. 0
a. The Analogy to General Average Contribution
The phenomenon of eve of bankruptcy conflicts finds an analogue in the
law of admiralty and the problem of general average contribution, which
attempts to minimize agency problems associated with diverse ownership. 3 1
The basic principle underlying general averaging is that if a ship loaded with
valuable cargo should founder at sea, the captain may make whatever sacri-
fices are necessary to prevent the ship and cargo from sinking altogether.
All owners involved in the sail will contribute thereafter to the general aver-
age expense according to their percentage of ownership. 2
Agency theory offers a persuasive justification for such a general average
rule. The captain is the agent of all of the parties participating in the ven-
ture. When a perilous situation arises, it is in the interest of all participants
that the captain take all interests equally into account, affecting whatever
sacrifice is necessary to promote the joint interests of all participants in the
voyage. One method of approximating the cooperative result is to encourage
the captain to act as if there were only one owner in the enterprise. If the
ownership interests were integrated, it would not matter whose property
were sacrificed, because all participants would bear the loss as joint
venturers.
Under agency theory, therefore, the purpose of general average rules is to
dissipate the captain's conflict between self-interest and duty at the moment
of sacrifice. At that critical time, the captain must decide if he should, for
example, jettison the cargo or cut off the mast. Absent a sharing rule, a bias
will necessarily invade the captain's judgment. The captain has an obvious
interest in preserving the ship for the benefit of the owner, his employer.
Moreover, if the captain jettisons the cargo, the adversely affected cargo
owners will predictably claim that the captain overlooked a less costly
method of sacrifice. Consequently, the captain is also motivated to minimize
30 Preference law will catch some, but not necessarily all, of this strategic behavior. A rule
such as § 547(c)(5), for example, can be used to avoid an absolute improvement in the
creditor's position on the eve of bankruptcy. But the secured creditor's position may not have
improved in absolute terms, although it may have improved in relative terms, due to the
secured creditor's access to decisionmaking controls. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV
1986).
31 The analogy to general average contribution builds on the discussion in Scott, Through
Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 700-07.
32 See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 244 (2d ed. 1975).
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any subsequent claims that his judgments were flawed. If the captain's con-
flicting interests are sufficiently strong at the moment of crisis, he will make
jettison decisions that are inconsistent with the joint interests of the parties.
The rule requiring a general average contribution encourages the captain to
make the most efficient jettison possible.
Claimants in the creditors' bargain can predict that analogous events may
occur on the eve of bankruptcy. The threat of a business failure owing to
complex and interactive contingencies (such as the effects of the stock mar-
ket collapse on supply and demand conditions in a particular industry) may
be seen as a common risk that, despite individual efforts, will inevitably occur
unless creditors agree to sacrifice a portion of their claim in order to save the
enterprise. On the other hand, the normal risks of business failure are not
common risks, and the interests that sustain the loss must bear it alone.33
This is true in the admiralty analogue as well. There is no right of general
average contribution in the ordinary case of loss or marine mishap. 4
Before any of the affected interests has a right to a general average contribu-
tion, three requirements must be met. First, there must be a common dan-
ger 31 that will cause inevitable losses unless a portion of the whole is
sacrificed to save the remainder. Second, in an attempt to avoid the peril,
part of the ship or cargo must be jettisoned.36 Third, the attempt to avoid
the common peril must be successful. 37 Thus, by analogy, eve of bankruptcy
contribution requires both a common peril and a sacrifice of individual
rights in order to rehabilitate the enterprise.
Anticipating these conditions, the parties to the creditors' bargain would
seek to avoid self-interested bias whenever such "jettison" decisions must be
made. In the bankruptcy analogue to general average contribution, a domi-
nant secured creditor-such as a general financing bank-is equivalent to
the ship's captain struggling to save the vessel in high seas. The dominant
secured creditor is peculiarly able to influence the course of events prior to
insolvency in such a way that its ultimate self-interest may be advanced.
33 This point provides a bridge to the literature on the efficiencies of differentiated capital
structures (such as secured credit). "Equal sharing" rules vis-a-vis all kinds of risks would
undermine the need for secured credit in the first place. See supra note 13.
34 See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 32, at 246. Any loss so regarded is designated as
a "particular" average. The owner who suffers such a loss may have a right of indemnity, but
there is no right of contribution based on general average.
35 The necessary and sufficient conditions for these common risks are analyzed in Part
I.B.l.a., see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. The concept of "common danger" is
defined in maritime law as "a danger in which ship, cargo, and crew all participate; a danger
imminent and apparently 'inevitable."' Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270, 303 (1850).
36 Barnard, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 303.
37 Id.; Cia. Atlantica Pacifica, S.A. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 274 F. Supp. 884, 889 (D.
Md. 1967).
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The interests of the owners as a group (secured creditors, unsecured credi-
tors, and equity) are advanced, however, only if the dominant secured credi-
tor acts as if it were the sole owner. Some form of sharing rule may promote
that cooperative behavior.
b. Risk Sharing as a Means of Bankruptcy Contribution
The preceding analysis suggests that participants in the ex ante bargain
would agree to contribution in bankruptcy so as to encourage an optimal
prebankruptcy jettison of some of the debtor's assets and liabilities.38 Ide-
ally, of course, the sacrifice would serve to avoid entirely the common peril
that threatens to trigger insolvency. In many instances, however, because
insolvency and business failure are not necessarily linked, the protective
umbrella of bankruptcy reorganization will be necessary to achieve success-
ful rehabilitation of the enterprise. In such cases, the willingness of claim-
ants to sacrifice some of their entitlements in the prebankruptcy period may
improve the prospects for a successful rehabilitation and increase the
expected value of the firm. Of course, the sacrifice must occur before insol-
vency, and the decision as to which portion of the debtor's assets or liabilities
is to be sacrificed will largely rest with the general financing secured credi-
tor. Thus, the right to a general average-type contribution if bankruptcy
results is a necessary inducement to secure the cooperation of all creditors.
38 The familiar problem known as "feeding the lien" provides a good example of the self-
interested behavior that may attend prebankruptcy decisionmaking. Suppose that Secured
Creditor has a security interest in all Debtor's presently held and after-acquired accounts and
that unanticipated circumstances have left Debtor with inadequate cash reserves to service its
debt and insufficient accounts to cover the secured loan. A sale of assets is thus necessary to
generate the cash to keep the business solvent. Assume further that Debtor must decide
whether to sell off used equipment or discount inventory in order to effect the needed jettison,
and that the value-maximizing choice is to sell the equipment for cash. Notwithstanding these
considerations, Secured Creditor has an incentive to exercise the leverage that its floating lien
provides to ihduce the debtor to declare a "fire sale" and dispose of the inventory at discount
prices. Such an action will serve two purposes: it will generate needed cash, and it will
generate the accounts necessary to increase the margin of security for Secured Creditor.
Obviously, it is in the interests of all parties that this potential conflict be reduced through
the terms of the ex ante bargain. Preference law is, by itself, inadequate to encourage Secured
Creditor to support the value-maximizing choice. First, this transfer may be made prior to the
90-day period provided by § 547. Second, even if the transfer is within 90 days of the
bankruptcy petition, it will be invulnerable under § 547(c)(5), so long as Secured Creditor's
improvement is only relative and not absolute. See supra note 30.
The effect of a sharing rule such as bankruptcy contribution is to moderate the returns from
self-interested behavior. If Secured Creditor encourages the inefficient option and Debtor
lands in bankruptcy, Secured Creditor must share with the other claimants some of the gains
from "feeding the lien." By reducing the benefits of self-interested action, a contribution rule
enhances the prospect of optimal cooperative behavior.
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The conditions that make contribution an attractive solution to conflicts
of interest between claimants are not peculiar to bankruptcy. It is important
to see, however, that these conflicts are peculiarly linked to the collectiviza-
tion problem that provides the normative justification for bankruptcy under
the simple creditors' bargain vision. Thus, to the extent that the creditors in
the ex ante bargain determine to collectivize in order to solve a central prob-
lem of noncooperation, they would necessarily agree to a contribution
arrangement in order to restrain eve of bankruptcy conflicts. In the absence
of bankruptcy contribution, the parties would anticipate inefficient jettisons
by secured creditors' exercising de facto control over the debtor's business
decisionmaking. Because such inefficiencies reduce total creditor wealth,
contribution would be a predictable prophylactic to any collectivization
process.
The parties to the ex ante bargain would also weigh the problems of imple-
menting a contribution scheme prior to reaching agreement on specific pro-
cedures. Obviously, a general average-type contribution that is triggered
only if bankruptcy proceedings are instituted exacerbates the problem of per-
verse incentives. This does not imply, however, that the parties would not
agree on a contribution rule. The presence of perverse incentives is clearly a
cost. Whether it would outweigh any resulting benefits remains an empirical
question.
3. The Valuation Dilemma: The Problem Of Firm-Specific
Capital Investments
The simple creditors' bargain model makes the further assumption that
the efforts of all claimants in the ex ante bargain are directed towards maxi-
mizing group welfare as measured in monetary or other objective terms. At
first glance this seems unproblematic. The value of an ordinary business
firm is based on a standard assumption of profit maximization. Yet a
number of firms facing bankruptcy do not comfortably fit this paradigm.
For example, small, closely held firms, particularly those in which a single
owner-manger has the equity interest, may be better described as a mix of
objective and idiosyncratic values. At least for some of these firms, the
owner-manager will anticipate making substantial nonpecuniary or senti-
mental investments during the life of the enterprise. These investments are
reflected in common metaphors such as "It's my life's work," and "My
name is over the door."39 Furthermore, an owner-manager's firm-specific
39 The anecdotal character of the common metaphors for firm-specific investment suggest
how difficult these investments are to characterize, much less to measure. Nevertheless, few
would argue with the proposition that owner-managers make capital investments in their
enterprises that are not entirely valued in money or money's worth.
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investment is essentially nondiversifiable. Thus, a risk-averse entrepreneur
may bear a degree of risk that, absent other forms of risk reduction, leaves
him with a suboptimal return.
How might the creditors' bargain differ if the assumption of objective val-
uation is relaxed? Assume initially that any bargain the parties strike can be
costlessly implemented. Under these conditions, debtors who anticipate
making substantial firm-specific capital investments in their enterprises
would be willing to buy additional "insurance" coverage to protect the
investments. In theory, this insurance protection could be provided in sev-
eral different ways. But standard options such as monetary payments would
be subject to moral hazard and false claims. A less costly alternative would
be to offer the equity interest a more generous opportunity for rehabilitation.
This form of prepaid insurance would reduce the risk of liquidation induced
by the fact that, but for the idiosyncratic value, the insolvent firm may be
worth more dead than alive.
The evidence that idiosyncratic value is not easily protected through
third-party insurance buttresses the assumption that parties who anticipate
such investments can insure most efficiently by modifying the terms of the ex
ante bargain itself.' This built-in insurance coverage is thus a form of risk
sharing of the type we have previously examined. For instance, the bargain-
ers might agree to reduce the payments to secured creditors or to restrain
foreclosure on collateral whenever these measures would improve margin-
ally the prospect of rehabilitation. It is important to emphasize that this
argument assumes that the owner-manager who contemplates idiosyncratic
investments would be interested only in purchasing a greater chance for
rehabilitation of the enterprise. In other words, firm-specific investments
impel a form of reorganization insurance, but not insurance against liquida-
tion under all circumstances.
This analysis, however, is not by itself sufficient to justify a sharing rule
between equity interests and creditors in bankruptcy. Even if we have
described a "deserving" class of equity claimants, on what basis can this
group be distinguished from others-those, for example, who are fully diver-
sified-who would not pay to insure against the loss of idiosyncratic value?
Moreover, any system attempting to implement such an insurance scheme
faces a further sorting problem. Legitimate claims of protection against the
destruction of idiosyncratic value will be hard to distinguish from illegiti-
mate claims, such as where the equity owner's incompetence or mismanage-
ment is the cause of the firm's problems.
40 See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev.
554, 578-83 (1977).
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For these reasons, it is tempting to argue that nonbankruptcy alternatives,
especially ordinary contractual mechanisms, are the optimal means of struc-
turing such a complex insurance scheme. If equity owners wish their credi-
tors to offer a form of reorganization insurance, it would be possible to
design contracts that provided such insurance without resort to bankruptcy.
In other words, the analysis may prove too much. If firm-specific value is
unprotected, reorganization insurance should be written generally or should
be implied in nonbankruptcy rules governing default and foreclosure.
It may be, however, that collective action problems in an individual col-
lection regime are so paralyzing that no single creditor would agree to a
form of reorganization insurance without a guaranty that all other creditors
would also abide by the rules. Enforcement problems outside bankruptcy
may mean that contractual options would not be available, even if reorgani-
zation insurance was otherwise desirable. A collective solution such as
bankruptcy may be the only place to determine whether the insurance pay-
out is appropriate in a particular case.41
Any such result means that one outcome prevails outside of bankruptcy
and another prevails inside of bankruptcy. Owner-managers may resort to
bankruptcy simply to secure the reorganization insurance, even if they were
not otherwise entitled to it. Transition costs and implementation problems
may swamp any gains otherwise to be made by such a scheme. The limiting
focus of Chapter 11 reorganizations, however, seems to provide a useful
method of screening for those debtors with an idiosyncratic capital invest-
ment. The best case for a distinct reorganization process is where many
claimants have made difficult-to-value investments in the debtor firm suffi-
cient to deter third-party purchases of the business as an entity in any liqui-
dation process. If so, then it is precisely the firms suited for reorganization
that are also likely to have equity interests that require supplemental
protection.
41 Bankruptcy courts traditionally look with hostility on cases where the debtor has
(essentially) only one creditor. See supra note 11. Under a simple creditors' bargain analysis,
this skepticism is normatively appropriate, as it implies the absence of a collective action
problem among claimants of the same group and instead reflects simply the result of the
original distribution of entitlements. The question of firm-specific investments, however, may
offer a different perspective on one-creditor bankruptcy cases. The issue becomes whether the
contract between the equity and the sole creditor should have reflected explicitly the
reorganization insurance. At least in cases where the one creditor did not expect to be the sole
creditor under all circumstances, the discussion in the text suggests that the parties may have
implicitly agreed to a form of reorganization insurance in bankruptcy.
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4. Nonconsensual Distributional Effects
Regardless of the ex ante agreement, any bankruptcy system will inevita-
bly be subject to random or unsystematic distributional effects. Ad hoc dis-
tributions may result from misinterpretations of the appropriate policies by
decisionmakers or from successful efforts by individual claimants to secure a
disproportionate share of the asset pool. They may also result from attempts
to decide relative value issues by using fairly crude rules of thumb. These
effects are some of the implementation costs that will influence the extent to
which the objectives of the bargainers can be realized.
More interesting than these unsystematic effects, however, are distribu-
tions to third parties who would not fairly be considered participants in a
creditors' bargain. These nonparticipating parties might include nonconsen-
sual interests such as tort claimants, residents of the community in which
the business is located, or any others affected by the liquidation of business
enterprises.
In some sense, these claimants are analogous to the victims of a common
disaster, such as a flood. When a community is devastated by flooding, a
state of emergency is frequently declared, and the victims are assisted with
public funds. It is quite appropriate for the state to respond when these
catastrophes are unavoidable. It is curious, though, that we are also willing
to assist when the disaster is foreseeable, as in the case of individuals who
choose to remain in the flood plain.42 Similarly, tort claimants, retired
employees, residents of the community, and other affected third parties
might well be considered "victims" of business failure and bankruptcy. It is
true that these parties make choices about where to work, with which firms
to deal, and what purchases to make. Yet these parties share an important
qcuality with the victims of true disasters that may explain why all such vic-
tims are the beneficiaries of distributions when catastrophe strikes. It is pos-
sible that people who live in flood plains, as well as the unsophisticated
claimants who interact with business firms, have no real choice. That is,
they cannot rely on risk-reducing alternatives such as insurance, security, or
other bonding mechanisms. Because these parties do not have an opportu-
nity to protect themselves with security, it can be argued that they "deserve"
a distribution of the assets in bankruptcy in the same way that flood victims
deserve assistance.43
It is not our goal in this Article to assess the normative appeal of this
42 Presumably, where the risks of flooding are known, affected parties could move to a safer
location or insure against the knowable risks of flooding. The government subsidy reduces
their incentives to do so. Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 4, at 968 n.247.
43 Id.; Note, supra note 12, at 1508.
1989]
Virginia Law Review
vision.' For our purposes here, it is important only to see that whatever the
merits of the claim that society owes such victims protection against disaster,
this protection does not derive from the consensual arrangements that would
underlie any ex ante creditors' bargain. Distributions to nonconsensual
claimants are conceptually different from those that would be agreed to in
any bargain in which individual self-interest was a central feature. In fact, it
may in some sense be analytically correct to suggest that the problems that
animate distribution to nonconsensual victims of common disasters are not
"bankruptcy" problems."a To be sure, the individual participants in the
creditors' bargain would presumably be as willing to support these claimants
as they would any other charitable cause. From the perspective of the col-
lective, however, these forms of redistribution will be seen as costs of bank-
ruptcy that will undermine, at least in part, the primary objectives of
collectivization.
It is not similarly correct, however, to characterize as bankruptcy costs
those distributions that might well be approved in the ex ante bargain. As
the preceding discussion shows, these "approved" distributions are part of
the benefits of a bankruptcy process in the very same sense that collectiviza-
tion in the first instance is a benefit of bankruptcy. They are, at least in
theory, an integral feature of any separate bankruptcy procedure that
trumps the existing mechanism of debt collection and distribution.
II. APPLYING THE MODEL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTIONAL
EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY
The common disaster formulation adds additional complexity to the cred-
itors' bargain model. Such complexity is not inherently desirable. Indeed,
44 For a detailed analysis of these questions in light of the particular problem of utility
regulation and bankruptcy, see Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the Administrative State, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Spring 1987, at 3; see also Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 846 (1984) (current bankruptcy law shortchanges future tort claimants, so Bankruptcy
Code should be changed to give such claimants reorganization initiation powers).
45 For example, society generally treats tort victims differently from employees and
residents of a community. Under most forms of legal rules in existence today, tort victims
have "claims" to a debtor's assets, whereas residents of a town do not. Firms, whether in
default or not, can move from a town, despite the objections of its residents. Firms cannot
likewise leave tort problems behind. Moreover, tort victims generally share as unsecured
creditors, having few opportunities to secure their claims. See Schwartz, Products Liability,
Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14
J. Legal Stud. 689 (1985); Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos
Times, the Worst of Times, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1045 (1984). State law may provide tort victims
with a statutory lien. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23:1 lf(f) (West Supp. 1988) (lien filed
by the Administrator of the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund against the property of a
debtor that is subject to a cleanup order has priority over all other claims or liens).
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the test of any model is whether it better predicts or explains observed fea-
tures of the bankruptcy process. Testing the enriched model is not easy. As
a preliminary effort, we have chosen three prominent features of the bank-
ruptcy process in which distributional effects are commonly observed: (1)
the powers of the bankruptcy trustee to enhance the estate; (2) the time-
value calculation required to reimburse secured creditors for delay costs; and
(3) the implementation of Chapter 11 reorganization plans. We now con-
sider whether a richer version of the creditors' bargain better explains the
apparent tensions that mark these features of federal bankruptcy law.
A. The Trustee's Collection Powers
L The Strong-arm Power of Section 544(a)
The operation of the so-called strong-arm clause of section 544(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code offers a classic illustration of the distributional effects of
bankruptcy.46 Assume, for example, that a creditor (Cl) lends Debtor
$50,000 on May 1 and in return takes a security interest in inventory and
equipment, but does not file a financing statement. On May 5, a trade credi-
tor (C2) lends Debtor $50,000 on open account. Five days later Debtor files
a petition in bankruptcy. In a contest between C1 and the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, the trustee can hvoid the $50,000 security interest under section
544(a)(1), even though no other creditor has acquired a lien against the
assets. This has the effect of bringing the debtor's inventory and equipment
covered by the security interest into the estate for pro rata distribution to
Cl, C2, and other general creditors.
The conventional justification for the strong-arm clause is that it promotes
the equality norm. This metaphor is unhelpful by itself, however, because
one needs to know equal relative to what. Secured creditors are certainly not
treated "equally" with equity in bankruptcy, even after application of section
544(a). The simple creditors' bargain explanation attempts to cure this
defect in the conventional justification. It posits that the normatively desira-
ble effect of section 544(a) is to implement the collective proceeding by freez-
ing prebankruptcy entitlements. In other words, the strong-arm rule ensures
that those similarly situated outside of bankruptcy will be treated equally in
bankruptcy. On May 10th, neither Cl nor C2 has taken the ultimate step to
assure its priority over the other, either by a filing or a judgment lien. Thus,
in a collective proceeding, they are in a position of equality.
46 Section 544(a) grants to the bankruptcy trustee the status of a judicial lien creditor from
the date of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a creditor actually exists. See
11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and § 9-
301(1)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987), the trustee in
bankruptcy obtains priority over an unperfected security interest existing on the date of filing.
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But this story by itself is not entirely convincing. In a contest under state
law between Cl and C2 on May 10th, C1 would prevail by the terms of the
Uniform Commercial Code's section 9-201. 4' Section 544(a) cannot, there-
fore, be seen simply as a provision preserving the relative positions of the
parties as they move from state law into bankruptcy. Instead, it has a dis-
tinct distributional effect. The simple creditors' bargain explanation
responds accordingly by changing the focus to relative value. To be sure, Cl
would prevail on May 10 if nothing more happened. Because the bank-
ruptcy filing ensures that nothing more will happen, one needs to predict
what would happen had bankruptcy not intervened. Because this outcome is
indeterminate, the best one can do is to treat Cl and C2 as relative equals,
the result of section 544(a).48
This explanation, however, does not avoid the distributional change that
section 544(a) makes in the nonbankruptcy entitlements. Instead, it assumes
that, for the sake of convenience, it is easier to presume a pro rata sharing
rule for all unsecured and unperfected secured creditors than it is to look
into the highly individualistic features of each creditor (whether unsecured
or unperfected) to see which creditor, in fact, was more likely to "win the
nonbankruptcy race." According to that explanation, convenience ulti-
mately lies behind the selection imposed by section 544(a).
Are any further insights offered by the expanded creditors' bargain vision
of bankruptcy? A common disaster explanation for section 544(a) relies on
the impulse to effect general average-type contribution in bankruptcy.
Recall that under this conception a dominant secured creditor is analogous
to the captain of the ship who earns an additional premium for successfully
negotiating the enterprise through perils. As a necessary corollary, the
group must ensure that these leadership decisions are consistent with the
interest of the collective. Information concerning the special relationship
between debtor and secured party is necessary if the group is to monitor the
secured creditor effectively. In the above example, the secured creditor, by
failing to file a finance statement, did not disclose key information important
to the collective interests of all creditors. The secured creditor thus forfeits
its right to the premium return and is treated as any other member of the
group.
In short, under this richer version of the creditors' bargain, section 544(a)
is not an equalizing rule as much as it is a leveling rule. It is a necessary
47 U.C.C. § 9-201 (1987) provides that "except as otherwise provided by this Act a security
agreement is effective according to its terms... against creditors." Because no other provision
of U.C.C. Article 9 subordinates Cl to C2, C1 would prevail under this section. See McCoid,
Bankruptcy, The Avoiding Powers, and Unperfected Security Interests, 59 Am. Bankr. L.J.
175, 188 (1985).
48 T. Jackson, supra note 1, at 70-79.
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prophylactic to ensure cooperative behavior by powerful creditors in the
critical period prior to bankruptcy.49 The sanction of relegating the secured
creditor to the ranks of all other claimants supports the general policy of
restraining eve of bankruptcy conflicts when "jettison" decisions are being
made.
The preceding argument suggests that several explanations for rules such
as section 544(a) are both possible and plausible. We do not mean to choose
here among these explanations. It is perfectly possible that one would need
to combine both explanations in order ftilly to understand the rule. For
example, the common disaster vision of section 544(a) focuses on security
interests that could have been publicly noted, but were not. Yet, numerous
statutory liens are accorded priority under section 545, irrespective of the
fact that they are not publicly noted.50 Thus, one needs to distinguish
between consensual liens (subject to section 544(a)) and statutory liens, per-
haps on the ground that only with the former is there a prospect of a domi-
nant secured creditor that may have significant control in the prebankruptcy
period. In short, the choice among these or any other competing explana-
tions ultimately rests on the accumulated evidence of the actual operation of
bankruptcy avoidance powers in particular cases.
2. Moore v. Bay and Section 544(b)
Section 544(b)51 and the rule of Moore v. Bay52 provide an even more
dramatic illustration of a similar distributional effect. Although the reach of
section 544(b) is now significantly limited under the new Code,53 it rein-
forces the deterrent effects of the trustee's avoidance powers. Imagine the
49 This view of § 544(a) looks only to the equalizing of the unperfected secured creditor with
the unsecured creditor. As for why a pro rata sharing rule is used among unsecured creditors,
one may have to rely on the superiority of an equal sharing rule as an ex ante solution to an ex
post distribution.
50 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1982); see, e.g., California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc. (In re Farmers Mkts.,
Inc.), 792 F.2d. 1400 (9th Cir. 1986); Artus v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, Employment See. Div.
(In re Anchorage Int'l Inn), 718 F.2d. 1446 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally Jackson, Statutory
Liens and Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Undoing the Confusion, 61 Am. Bankr. L.J. 287
(1987) (suggesting status test should be that if interest is effective outside of bankruptcy, then it
is effective inside bankruptcy as well).
51 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. IV 1986) (the trustee may avoid any transfer of the debtor's
property that is voidable under nonbankruptcy law by any unsecured creditor who holds a
claim against the estate).
52 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931) ("[C]laims which for want of record or for other reasons would not
have been valid liens as against the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens
against his estate."). This has been interpreted to mean that a transfer that is invalid as against
one creditor can be avoided totally by the trustee.
53 See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5787, 5871.
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following scenario. On June 1, 1986, C1 lends a manager of Debtor $1 mil-
lion as part of a leveraged buyout in which the manager is acquiring the
common stock of Debtor. In return, C1 takes a security interest from
Debtor in all of the firm's inventory and equipment, which is valued at over
$1 million. At the time of the transaction, Debtor already owed C2, a trade
creditor, $3000 on open account. If Debtor fies for bankruptcy on July 1,
1987, can the trustee successfully avoid any or all of the security interest
held by Cl?
The arrangement between Cl and Debtor may be vulnerable as a fraudu-
lent conveyance on several grounds. First, the trustee may argue that the
security interest was a transfer made with actual intent to hinder creditors
by imperiling the general creditors' claims against Debtor. 4 The close rela-
tionship between Debtor and manager may supply the "badge of fraud" that
supports a presumption of actual intent.
Moreover, the doctrine of constructive fraud offers a further argument
when combined with an analysis that collapses the two transactions. Viewed
as discrete transactions, the transfer of the security interest from Debtor to
C1 was for fair consideration (in exchange for the $1 million loan). Once the
two transactions are collapsed, however, the effect is that C1 gave $1 million
to the manager with Debtor picking up the tab." A court may decide to
pursue C1 on the ground that, because C1 knew the money would go to the
manager, it really did not give value to Debtor. Although CI did not "get
something for nothing," one can conclude, on "gatekeeping" grounds, that a
fraudulent conveyance action is appropriate against C1 (with C1 then suc-
ceeding to the action against the manager as the ultimate beneficiary of the
conveyance). Under this conception, the transfer of a security interest by
Debtor to guarantee the loan to the acquiring manager was given without
fair consideration and, in this case, rendered Debtor insolvent. Thus, the
transfer of the security interest to C1 may also be void as against C2, the
preexisting creditor, under the state's fraudulent conveyance law. 6
54 See Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1985); Unif. Fraudulent
Transfer Act § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985).
55 The transaction is identical to a case where Cl lends Debtor money and the money is
then given to Manager (or the old shareholders) in a pre- or post-buyout dividend. As
constructed, and unless Manager can advance a synergy argument, Manager (or the old
shareholders) received a transfer from Debtor without giving fair consideration. For that
reason, a recovery against Manager (or the old shareholders) on fraudulent conveyance
grounds seems plausible. See Jackson, The Continuing Life of Dean v. Davis, 1988 Ann. Surv.
of Bankr. L. 63.
56 Id. at 70-73. Section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), which was
adopted in over 30 states, Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985), provides
that a transfer made without fair consideration that renders the debtor insolvent is void as to
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Because the transfer occurred more than one year before bankruptcy, the
trustee cannot proceed under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid
Cl's security interest.57 The trustee may instead use C2's state law claim
against C1 to avoid the transfer under section 544(b). What makes section
544(b) unique is that it incorporates the rule of Moore v. Bay. By using this
provision, the trustee is not limited to the $3000 claim of C2 but can avoid
the entire $1 million security interest claimed by Cl and then retain the
entire value of the debtor's inventory and equipment for the benefit of all the
general creditors. Viewed through the lens of the simple creditors' bargain
model, the effect of section 544(b) is to redistribute assets beyond the
requirements of collectivization, thus exacerbating perverse incentive
problems.58
Does the expanded creditors' bargain provide a rationale for section
544(b) and for the rule'of Moore v. Bay? Clearly, section 544(b) operates to
punish the secured creditor. It is not so clear, however, why the sanction is
so severe and furthermore why the distributional effect extends to all credi-
tors, not just to those who actively extended credit prior to the fraudulent
transfer. The answers to these questions may, once again, be traced to the
collective concern for ameliorating conflicts on the eve of bankruptcy. In
this case, by hypothesis, C1 has misbehaved. 59 Given the dominant position
of the secured creditor, the cost of detecting such misbehavior is likely to be
extremely high. A leveraged buyout may have either benign or malignant
purposes. The malign scenario is that under the guise of a value-maximizing
transaction certain creditors are exploited in a one-shot transfer that is hard
to police. Because monitoring is so difficult, in the absence of legal sanctions
other exploitable creditors would make suboptimal efforts to detect the
fraud. If the probability of detection of a malignant buyout is less than 1.0,
the effective sanction can be raised by increasing the nominal sanction in
those cases where the transaction is determined to violate the interests of the
existing creditors. Id. at 474. The UFCA is increasingly being replaced by the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. Id. at 88 (Supp. 1988).
57 Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1) provides that the trustee may avoid a transfer of debtor's
property made within one year of the filing, if the debtor received less than fair value and was
or became insolvent, having unreasonably small capital to engage in business and repay
anticipated debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A similar result would
prevail under § 5(a) of the newly promulgated Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See Unif.
Fraudulent Transfer Act § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
58 But see Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself, 39 Stan. L. Rev.
1519, 1530-32 (1987) ("[No perfect matching of the likely nonbankruptcy state law result can
occur. Moore therefore cannot be dismissed for failing to provide such a match.").
59 Actually Cl has misbehaved only if one imposes a policing duty on it: the misbehavior in
the first instance is that of the manager.
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collective.60
This argument, however, does not explain why the Moore v. Bay rule is
applied only in bankruptcy, but not in fraudulent conveyance law gener-
ally.61 Other considerations do suggest, however, that implementation
problems aside, limiting this rule to bankruptcy is optimal. One obvious
problem with implementing the rule of Moore v. Bay outside of bankruptcy
is that a single creditor who sues to set aside the fraudulent conveyance will
benefit from avoidance of the entire transfer. Such a "bounty" outside of a
collective regime may induce undesirable behavior. The harmful effects of
bounty hunting could be obviated, or at least reduced, if the remedy were
available only to the creditors as a group and only where the recovery would
be spread among all the creditors.
3. Executory Contracts under Section 365 and Loan Reinstatement under
Section 1124
The avoidance powers of section 544, together with the preference rules of
section 547,62 can be seen as methods of encouraging individual creditors to
behave cooperatively in the period just before bankruptcy. These provisions
redistribute assets in order to ameliorate anticipated conflicts between self-
interest and collective responsibility. Certain other rules, however, require a
different rationalization. Under section 365, the trustee can either assume or
reject executory contracts of the debtor.63 The rejection of an executory
60 Under this analysis, § 544(b) may be too narrow in other respects. Section 544(b) is
generally considered to give a trustee only the avoidance powers of unsecured creditors, not the
creditors' rights as to damages. See Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.),
816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jacoway v. Anderson, 108 S. Ct. 147 (1987); cf.
Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972) (result under prior law).
Thus, for example, U.C.C. § 6-104 (1987) currently provides creditors with a power to avoid
defective bulk transfers-a power available to the trustee under § 544(b). But the proposed
revision of Article 6 will change the remedy to a damage action and, as currently interpreted, a
§ 544(b) action will no longer be available to the trustee. See Hawkland, Proposed Revisions
to U.C.C. Article 6, 38 Bus. Law. 1729, 1745 (1983). Why § 544(b) so limits the trustee's
powers is not clear. See Letter from Frank Kennedy to Joel Zweibel (March 9, 1988) (copy on
file with Virginia Law Review Association) ("If the creditors of a seller can recover the
amount of their claims from a noncomplying buyer, a bankruptcy court may view the result as
in substance and effect an avoidance of the bulk transfer.").
61 Moreover, because § 544(b)-and hence the reach of Moore-is not limited to fraudulent
conveyance rules, it is unclear whether the deterrence-type argument we have sketched in the
text for fraudulent conveyance law would necessarily apply with equal validity to other
applications of Moore, such as in the case of violations of bulk sales laws.
62 I1 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
63 Id. § 365(a) ("[The trustee... may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor."). The standard definition of an executory contract can be found in the
legislative history to § 365. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6303 (1977) ("It generally includes contracts on
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obligation has the same effect as does any other unpaid claim. Because
bankruptcy is a contractual breach, it relegates the contract holder to the
status of a general creditor. The executory contract also entitles the debtor
to a return performance. Thus, the contractual obligation is an asset as well
as a liability. The same effect may occur in the case of unpaid loans.
Whereas an unpaid loan is usually considered a liability in bankruptcy, there
are situations where it is an asset as well-such as where the loan is both
fully secured and below-market at the time of bankruptcy. In those cases,
the debtor would rather use the principal than repay the creditor in full.
As a result, there may be cases where the debtor wishes to "assume" the
asset reflected in a favorable executory contract orbelow-market loan. Both
section 365(b) and section 1124(2) permit this, notwithstanding defaults or
the advent of bankruptcy, as long as any substantive defaults are cured. 64
The simple creditors' bargain explanation for these provisions focuses on the
change of ownership reflected in bankruptcy, where the creditors suliplant
the old equity owners. Thus conceived, these rules support the collective
interest by reinstating obligations breached by the equity owners in the
immediate prebankruptcy period, at a time when the equity owners did not
necessarily have the interests of the collective in mind.
The sharing mandated under sections 365 and 1124(2), however, is often
more extensive than this reinstatement justification would require. These
more pervasive distributional effects can be at least partially explained by the
common disaster conceptualization. The case of R.S. Pinellas Motel Part-
nership illustrates the risk-sharing features of these sections.65 The bankrupt
debtor in Pinellas was a Ramada Inn franchisee. The franchise contract pro-
vided, inter alia, that the franchisor could terminate the contract with notice
which performance remains due to some extent on both sides."); see also Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy (pt. 1), 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 450-62 (1973) (same).
64 Bankruptcy Code § 1124(2) provides that a class of claims is unimpaired if,
notwithstanding a contractual right of acceleration, the reorganization plan cures any default,
reinstates the contract rate of interest, and compensates the claimant for any damages resulting
from the default. The distributional intent of this provision is suggested by the Senate Report
on § 1124(2):
The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a temporary crisis which the
plan of reorganization is intended to clear away. The holder of a claim or interest who
under the plan is restored to his original position, when others receive less or get
nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain.
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5787, 5906. There is an exception for certain contracts in § 365(c), although the prohibitions
on assumption in § 365(c) are generally thought to be more appropriately conceived as
prohibitions on assignment in § 365(f). See National Bankruptcy Conference Report (Work-
ing Draft, March 1988).
65 R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership v. Ramada Inns, Inc. (In re R.S. Pinellas Motel
Partnership), 2 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979).
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if the franchisee failed to maintain quality standards. Because Pinellas pro-
vided substandard facilities, Ramada elected to terminate the franchise, but
the termination notice was not received until after Pinellas had filed for reor-
ganization under Chapter 11.
The court held that the attempt to terminate the franchise after the filing
was an attempt to recover the property of the estate within section 362(a)(3)
and was barred by the automatic stay. Despite the substandard facilities, the
debtor in possession was able to assume the franchise under section
365(b)(1) by giving adequate assurances that the substandard facilities would
promptly be brought into compliance with Ramada's standards. Clearly,
absent bankruptcy, Ramada could have terminated Pinellas's franchise for
substandard performance. The termination in this case thus cannot be
explained as the reinstatement of a strategically breached contract. Pinellas
directly raises the question: Why shouldn't the franchisee in bankruptcy
have to play by the same rules as other franchisees?
The most satisfying explanation of Pinellas rests on the relational charac-
ter of the franchise contract. The relationship between Pinellas and Ramada
is a co-venture in which the parties share joint interests. Because Ramada
will share some of the upside of the venture, it should share some of the
downside as well. This conclusion is buttressed by the conditions of uncer-
tainty and complexity that characterize the relational paradigm. Under
these conditions, the expanded bargain model predicts that parties will often
agree to share some risks. If certain contingencies are common, and both
parties are risk averse, a risk-sharing scheme reduces uncertainty and thus
reduces the cost of the risk for both. But in order to enforce such a risk-
sharing rule, a companion requirement would prohibit termination for any
reason once the risk of bankruptcy materializes. While Ramada should be
entitled to employ alternative means of compelling compliance with quality
standards, the right of termination is trumped by bankruptcy.66
Viewed from this perspective, the assumption provisions of section 365
and section 1124(2) are "off the rack" contract terms that offer a convenient
sharing rule as a hedge against the risk of business failure. By precluding
termination upon insolvency, Ramada is required to continue to contribute
to the venture and share some of the costs of insolvency. If the market value
of the franchise exceeds the royalties paid by Pinellas in bankruptcy (a plau-
sible assumption), then Pinellas is capturing economic rents that outside of
66 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted this argument
implicitly in Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer
Communications, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987) (unilateral termination of joint marketing
agreement due to debtor's declaration of bankruptcy violates the automatic stay, even though
terminating party was entitled to terminate agreement under state law).
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bankruptcy would be owned by Ramada.67 The benefits of such a sharing
rule derive from the expectational benefits to equity and other general credi-
tors who are participants in the co-venture. The restraints on termination
reflected in sections 365 and 1124 reduce the risk of liquidation and enhance
the pool of assets available for general distribution.
To be sure, these effects are not cost-free. Presumably, Ramada will
adjust to the rule, either by avoiding relational financing arrangements or by
increasing the price of the franchise. Moreover, implying a sharing rule only
in bankruptcy invites Pinellas's management to invoke bankruptcy even
when it is not in Pinellas's and Ramada's joint interest to do so. It remains,
therefore, an empirical question whether the distributional effects that result
from this broader interpretation of section 365 and 1124 offer net benefits to
the claimants as a group.
B. Reimbursement For Delay Costs: The Time- Value Problem
L The Valuation Dilemma
A pervasive, if subtle, form of redistribution in bankruptcy is triggered
whenever security interests in specific assets are converted into deferred cash
payments. The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay
of any action by the secured creditor to collect claims or seize the collat-
eral.6' A secured creditor can be relieved from a stay only by proving that
the debtor has no equity interest in the secured assets and that the assets are
not necessary for reorganization or that the collateral is jeopardized.69 In
the meantime, the debtor in possession (or the bankruptcy trustee) may con-
tinue to operate the business so long as the secured party is given adequate
protection.70
Assessing the question of whether the secured party is entitled to relief
from the stay and whether protection is adequate, raises vexing valuation
questions. This is especially true when the protection offered is periodic cash
payments. Furthermore, a reorganization plan can be "crammed down"
67 This story may also help explain § 365(f), which permits a debtor to assign an executory
contract, and hence capture those rents, even when the debtor has no other use for the asset.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (1982). The assignment case is more problematic, however, because it
introduces a new party involuntarily into the relationship. We note for now only that the
assignment rule of § 365(f) is not replicated in § 1124.
68 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982) (the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of "any
act to... perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate").
69 Id. § 362(d); see also Southwest Fla. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Jacobsen J-J Ranch, Inc. (In re
Jacobsen J-J Ranch, Inc.), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 245 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1978).
70 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The court has broad latitude in determining
what protection is adequate, including provisions for replacement liens, periodic cash
payments, or the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's asset claim. Id.
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over the objections of a class of impaired creditors if it offers cash payments
that are "fair and equitable."7 1 Obviously, the sufficiency of the creditors'
protection in each instance depends on how the creditors' interests are
valued.7 2
An important aspect of this question is whether an undersecured creditor
is entitled to any protection for the costs of delay itself. The United States
Supreme Court recently held in United States Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates73 that the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code negated any inference that an undersecured creditor was entitled to
compensation for the opportunity costs of delay caused by the bankruptcy
process. Thus, as to the period during bankruptcy when the automatic stay
is effective, delay costs can no longer be recovered.
The result in Timbers is rather plainly inconsistent with the simple credi-
tors' bargain model, which views the automatic stay as a withdrawal of a
secured creditor's state law rights of foreclosure. While bankruptcy policy
might sensibly require the secured creditor to leave the asset in place for the
greater good of the claimants as a group, nothing in that policy requires the
secured creditor to bear any of the costs of the bankruptcy proceeding.
Thus, Timbers is at odds with the simple creditors' bargain premise that the
relative value of entitlements in bankruptcy should not deviate from those
outside of bankruptcy, except insofar as necessary to implement the collec-
tive proceeding.
This deviation from the simple creditors' bargain is less clear, but evident
nonetheless, at the conclusion of the bankruptcy case. At that time, a
secured creditor will typically be offered deferred cash payments equivalent
to the discounted present value of the collateral. Although time value is
explicitly incorporated into the statute,74 the key to the conversion process is
the choice of an appropriate discount rate. In order to avoid any distribu-
tional effects, the court must award a discount rate similar to the rate credi-
tors would receive under state law for comparable collateral in the hands of
a comparable (postbankruptcy) debtor. Assuming the presence of an accel-
eration clause, 75 secured creditors are entitled to the entire outstanding prin-
71 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982).
72 See generally Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1061
(1985) (valuation of assets, liabilities, and distributions).
73 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
74 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing that a secured creditor
receive over time the present value of its allowed secured claim in order for a proposed plan of
reorganization to gain court approval).
75 Bankruptcy law provides such an acceleration clause as an "off the rack" rule under
§ 502, subject to reinstatement under § 1124(2). See id. §§ 502, 1124(2).
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cipal upon default. This amount, paid in cash, or in kind by seizure of the
collateral, can then be reinvested at the current market rate of interest.
Some bankruptcy courts have awarded secured creditors discount rates
similar to the current market rate.76 An even larger number of bankruptcy
courts have declined to follow this approach, but instead have adopted a
variety of rates that vary from the current market rate for similar loans.
Frequently, it is clear that the courts endorse redistribution from secured
creditors to unsecured creditors and equity interests. One commonly
adopted rate is the rate payable by delinquent taxpayers, the average pre-
dominant prime rate quoted by commercial banks to large businesses.7 7
Other courts have awarded the coupon yield rate of fifty-two week treasury
bills.7 8 One court described this rate as "reasonably responsive to current
economic conditions ... yet ... not an unfair burden on... debtors."7 9 On
the other hand, these courts believe that the contract or market rate is
"unreasonable and inequitable ... and would jeopardize an otherwise good
plan to the detriment of other affected creditors and particularly the holders
of unsecured claims." 80
Taken together, these cases reflect a strong vision of the bankruptcy pro-
cess: secured creditors are not entitled to current market rates because pro-
tecting their interests in full will necessarily reduce the share awarded to
unsecured creditors and equity interests. The failure to protect the "delay
costs" secured creditors incur in bankruptcy thus seems to be a clear viola-
tion of the maximization norm, untrue to the simple creditors' bargain.
2. Non-reimbursement as Risk-Sharing Insurance
A risk-sharing explanation of the time-value problem relies on the diffi-
culty of distinguishing ex ante between risks subject to individual control
and those common risks that are so interrelated that no such risk reduction
is feasible. We may simply be unable to decide who among shareholders and
unsecured creditors deserve relief and who failed to exercise necessary
prebankruptcy precautions. If this is the case, denying secured creditors
protection against delay or selecting a less than compensatory discount rate
are methods of spreading the risk of common disaster insolvencies across the
population of parties who use the bankruptcy process. They are, in effect,
76 See, e.g., Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 429, 431 (6th Cir.
1982); In re Scovill, 18 Bankr. 633, 634 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982); In re Landmark at Plaza Park
Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 657-58 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
77 See, e.g., In re Caudle, 13 Bankr. 29, 37-38 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1981); In re!Ziegler, 6
Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
78 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542, 543 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
79 Ziegler, 6 Bankr. at 6.
80 Caudle, 13 Bankr. at 38.
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forms of insolvency insurance.81 Secured creditors in the ex ante bargain
will simply assess a premium for assuming the burden of the risk-sharing
component of the credit relationship. When bankruptcy occurs, the use of
less than market discount rates provides a fairly simple way of structuring
the payout for the insurance scheme. The insurance premium would be paid
willingly by unsecured creditors if the explicit premium cost were less than
the increase in risk cost if all risks were borne individually.
In sum, the adoption of a systematic and predictable discount rate that
returns less than full time value to the secured creditor is consistent, in the-
ory, with the expanded creditors' bargain. If the incidence of common risks
is significant, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity claimants
would predictably agree to insure against such risks through a risk-sharing
scheme. Imposing delay costs on secured creditors so as to enhance the
expected return for general creditors is a plausible means of administering
such a scheme.
C. Chapter 11 Reorganization
L The Case For Reorganization
Nowhere are the distributional effects of bankruptcy more pronounced,
and their justification more uncertain, than in corporate reorganization
under Chapter 11. Indeed, as Douglas Baird has shown, the case for Chap-
ter 11 reorganization is uneasy at best.82 The creditors' bargain perspective
challenges the traditional justification for a reorganization proceeding. To
be sure, total creditor wealth is often maximized by maintaining the going
concern value of the firm. Going concern value, however, can be realized in
a Chapter 7 liquidation by the simple expedient of a sale of the business to a
third-party buyer. Furthermore, a third-party sale should generally be the
optimal means of maximizing asset value. Such a sale generates market val-
ues that are easier to establish and fairer to administer; it promotes a search
for firms that can be salvaged and enhances the expertise of buyers. By per-
mitting each claimant's share to be accurately measured, a cash sale reduces
conflicts among the various claimants.83
Even in cases where the distinct feature of the firm is the unique or idio-
syncratic contribution of the owner-manager, a reorganization is not neces-
S Query, however, why the form of the insurance would differ during the automatic stay in
bankruptcy (§ 361 as interpreted by Timbers) from the rule after a bankruptcy plan has been
confirmed (§ 1129(b)(2)(a)(i)).
82 Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986).
83 See Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 Colum.
L. Rev. 527 (1983). An attempt to mimic such a result in the Chapter 11 context is set forth in
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775 (1988) (use
of options to provide entitlements for different classes in the securities of a reorganized firm).
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sary to maximize asset values. Undervaluation problems-the traditional
justification for the Chapter 11 process-could be solved in such cases by the
owner-manager reacquiring the firm from the third-party buyer (or becom-
ing a part of the buying syndicate).
A market-sale alternative, however, is appropriate only if no risk sharing
is required (other than as already reflected in nonbankruptcy rules and con-
tracts) or if risk-sharing features can be inserted into the distribution of the
proceeds from the sale. On the other hand, if certain forms of risk sharing
are desirable, and if they justify adjustments in the relationships among vari-
ous classes of claimants, the case for a distinct reorganization process is
stronger.84
The case for reorganization is bolstered further if we make a more com-
plex, "multirelational" assumption. Such an assumption increases the com-
plexity of the risk-sharing arrangements and introduces the greater
intractability of market solutions to valuation problems. Suppose that a gen-
eral financing bank, several trade suppliers, a group of key employees, and
the owner-manager have all made firm-specific investments in the enterprise.
Assume furthermore that these contributions are synergistic. These syner-
gies are a product of various economies of scale, coordination, and agglom-
eration. Under these conditions, it becomes very costly to bargain among all
affected claimants in order to secure their participation in a buyout. More-
over, the parties must bargain over future contributions as well as past risk-
sharing agreements. These bargaining difficulties are exacerbated by time
constraints. While a buyer ultimately may be able to reach a bargain with
all of the affected parties, valuing such multirelational firms is costly, and
search costs are high.
Can a reorganization process ameliorate any of these problems? Some of
the provisions of Chapter 11 are responsive to the difficulties of multiparty
bargaining, while others arguably promote risk-sharing agreements. The
problems of multiparty bargaining are ameliorated by rules permitting cur-
rent management to remain as the debtor in possession and to make ordi-
nary business decisions unimpeded by the ongoing efforts to reorganize."5
84 One could, of course, attempt to impose risk-sharing features on the distribution of the
sale proceeds. But once the mechanical rules of § 726 for distribution are abandoned,
something like the rules found in Chapter 11 are necessarily reintroduced. See 11 U.S.C. § 726
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). If that is so, not much would have been gained by resorting to
Chapter 7 and then introducing risk-sharing rules into the distributional process.
85 See id. §§ 1107(a), 363(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 1107 permits the existing
management in a Chapter 11 case to remain as debtor in possession with "all the rights...
powers ... and duties" of the trustee. Among other rights, the trustee is authorized under
§ 363(c)(1) to "enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in
the ordinary course of business... and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of
business, without notice or a hearing."
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These provisions reduce the urgency in formulating a viable plan. More-
over, the disclosure requirements of section 1125 require each claimant to, in
effect, "show its hand."86 Disclosure tends to reduce the strategic behavior
that results from information asymmetries and impedes multiparty
bargaining.
The impulse toward risk sharing, on the other hand, is encouraged by
Chapter 11 rules providing leverage to unsecured creditors and residual
claimants during the negotiation process. For example, section 1121(b)
grants the debtor the exclusive right for 120 days to propose a reorganization
plan.87 Studies on agenda influence confirm the substantial leverage this
provides the debtor (and existing management) in negotiating over any pro-
posal to restructure the firm.88
Notwithstanding these provisions, the ambitious objectives of Chapter 11
are threatened by substantial implementation problems. In order to give the
firm a sound capital structure, the parties must recapitalize to prevent the
firm from being overburdened with debt and fixed interest charges. In turn,
this presents a new problem. Not only must the reorganization process
determine going concern value, but now it must determine the new capital
structure as well. Thus, reorganization is necessarily a more complex and
attenuated process and inevitably presents many more opportunities for
abuse.
2. The Distributional Effects of Reorganization
There are good reasons to believe that a Chapter 11 proceeding encour-
ages substantial redistribution among groups of claimants, especially in cases
of closely held, multirelational firms. A simple example may illustrate how
the dynamics of reorganization promote redistribution. Assume Old Corp.
enters Chapter 11 with the following debt structure: $3 million is owed to
secured bank and $4.5 million is owed to trade creditors. Assume further
that the going concern value of Old Corp. is $6 million and that its liquida-
tion value if assets are sold off piecemeal is $4.5 million. Obviously, the
bank's interest is to cash out its $3 million secured claim immediately, since
it has nothing to gain from waiting, and things could get worse. On the
other hand, the owner-manager and other shareholders are motivated to
wait under all conditions. Because the shareholders have little chance of
currently realizing anything, they have nothing to lose from waiting (except
86 Id. § 1125 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (any claimant soliciting acceptance of a
reorganization plan must provide an approved disclosure statement containing adequate
information such that a reasonable investor could make an informed judgment about the plan).
87 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982).
88 See Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 Va. L. Rev. 561 (1977).
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for lost opportunities), and things could always get better. The third group,
the trade creditors, have the best incentives to maximize the value of the firm
because they have something to gain as well as something to lose by the
choice between immediate liquidation and delay. Under these conditions, a
simple maximization model argues for permitting the unsecured creditors to
resolve the fate of the firm. Substantial case authority, however, suggests
that this result is not likely to occur.
The case of In re Lionel Corp. 9 evidences the reluctance of courts to
embrace fully an asset-maximizing conception of reorganization. The debtor
corporation in Lionel filed a Chapter 11 petition, and existing management
remained in control as debtor in possession. The firm had assets valued at
$169 million and liabilities of $192 million. The creditors' committee repre-
sented unsecured creditors whose claims totalled $136 million. The key
asset of the firm was the Dale Company, of which Lionel owned eighty-two
per cent of the common stock. The debtor in possession decided to sell Dale
for $43 million under section 363(b), and the creditors committee (composed
of unsecured creditors) approved the sale.90 The equity committee, how-
ever, opposed the sale, arguing that authorizing a section 363(b) sale would
be to effectively bypass the Chapter 11 reorganization process.
The court thus confronted the question whether section 363(b) properly
could be used to effect a sale of most of the corporate assets of a Chapter 11
firm. The court held that, in order to protect junior interests, there must be
a stated business justification for the sale other than appeasing creditors. In
this case, the only justification for the sale was pressure by the major
unsecured creditors for a faster resolution of the proceeding, and the need
for speed was not a qualifying reason.
In terms of asset maximization, the Lionel decision seems clearly wrong.
If maximizing total creditor wealth is the objective, then the creditors' com-
mittee is the optimal decisionmaker. To disapprove a section 363(b) sale
under these circumstances, therefore, can only encourage bankruptcy shar-
ing by further restricting creditors' access to their share of the bankruptcy
estate. These restraints serve to enhance the ability of certain unsecured
s9 Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063
(2d Cir. 1983); see also Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th
Cir. 1987) (no authority to pay some creditors prior to consummation of plan of
reorganization), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1228 (1988).
90 Bankruptcy Code § 363(b)(1) provides that the trustee or debtor in possession may, after
notice and a hearing, sell or lease property of the estate outside of the ordinary course of
business. Such "extraordinary" transactions are to be distinguished from those arising in the
ordinary course of business, which are authorized under § 363(c)(1) without the requirement
of notice and a hearing. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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creditors and equity interests to negotiate a reorganization plan that distrib-
utes some creditor wealth to other claimants.
3. Absolute Priority and Contribution
It is tempting to suggest that cases like Lionel, and the procedural rules
that offer further leverage to equity interests, are insignificant given the
requirement of absolute priority retained by the "cram down" rules of sec-
tion 1129(b). 9' The absolute priority rule prohibits a class of interests from
participating in a reorganization unless all superior classes have been com-
pensated in full. Because debtor firms usually do not have sufficient assets to
compensate outstanding claims fully, and because equity claims rank at the
bottom, the absolute priority rule seems to exclude most equity holders from
sharing in any reorganization.
The contribution rule, however, puts a well-established gloss on absolute
priority, thus softening the impact of section 1129(b) on equity holders.
Under the contribution rule, equity interests are permitted to participate in a
reorganization if they make a fresh contribution to the firm's capital, pro-
vided that the contributions are proportionate in value to equity's share of
the reorganized company.92
At first glance, the contribution rule may appear to be consistent with
absolute priority because it purports to require new value from equity. Yet
giving equity the exclusive right to purchase a position in a reorganized firm
is, by definition, a violation of absolute priority. The right to make a contri-
bution is itself a valuable property right without regard to the conditions
under which contribution is made.93 Furthermore, the contribution rule
91 Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b) authorizes the bankruptcy court to confirm a reorganization
plan, notwithstanding the objections of an impaired class of claimants, if the plan does not
discriminate unfairly and is "fair and equitable" to the dissenting classes. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
The "fair and equitable" language has been held to incorporate the judicially created absolute
priority rule. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-19 (1939).
92 See Case, 308 U.S. 106 (establishing the rule requiring a proportionality between
contribution and retained equity). For a thoughtful discussion of the redistributional effects of
the contribution rule, see D. Skeel, The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's
Contribution Rule Doctrine [in] In re Ahlers (unpublished manuscript on file with Virginia
Law Review Association); see also Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans:
Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 Emory L.J. 1009, 1012 (1987) ("loss is
distributed by bargaining").
93 Moreover, the contribution rule may violate the current wording of § 1129(b), although
not the dicta of Case. As codified, the § 1129(b) version of the absolute priority rule prohibits
retention by a junior class of anything "on account of" old interests if seniors have not been
paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1982). Limiting new contributions to holders
of old equity interests defines the new contributors in terms of their old interests. See also D.
Skeel, supra note 92, at 19-20 (contribution rule conflicts with absolute priority by allowing
equity holders to receive value on account of their former status).
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violates the maximization norm whenever the "value" of the equity partici-
pation exceeds the "value" of the contribution, which presumably is often
the case. Otherwise, equity obviously would not propose the exchange.
The distributional effects of contribution might be trivial if the rule as
interpreted by courts were strictly limited to contributions in "money or in
money's worth."9 4 But recently the stakes have been higher. In In re
Ahlers, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit confirmed a reorganization plan in which the equity interests promised
to contribute future labor on the family farm.95 Although reversed by the
Supreme Court,9 6 the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Ahlers offers further evi-
dence of courts' willingness to accept substitutes for cash contributions so
long as the contribution can be measured monetarily.97 Despite the reversal
of Ahlers,9s the general acceptance of cash substitutes, even if they are seen
as contributions to capital, enables equity to propose confirmable reorganiza-
tion plans in contexts where reorganization would not otherwise occur.99
94 See Case, 308 U.S. at 122 (equity holders' "participation must be based on a contribution
in money or in money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the
participation of the [equity holder].").
95 Ahlers v. Northwest Bank Worthington (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
96 Northwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
97 Because the Ahlers' contribution could be measured in monetary terms, the majority
suggested that the Case money-or-money's-worth standard was satisfied:
Certainly, a farmer's efforts in operating and managing his farm is [sic] essential to any
successful farm reorganization, and this yearly contribution is measurable in money or
money's worth.... Accordingly, the farmer should be entitled to participate in the plan
to the extent of this contribution, even though more senior claims are not provided for
in full under the plan.
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402. The Supreme Court disagreed, believing the case was squarely con-
trolled by the "slippery slope" dicta in Case. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. at 966-68 (citing Case, 308 U.S.
at 122-23).
98 The reversal of Ahlers came as little surprise as other courts have been reluctant to
recognize promises of future services as sufficient value to justify contribution. See, e.g., In re
Stegall, 64 Bankr. 296, 299 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 85 Bankr. 510 (1987). ("Ahlers is
the first and only case ever to hold that the promise of future labor is an adequate substitute for
a new capital contribution.").
99 See, e.g., In re Potter Material Servs., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986) (cash and
personal guarantee); Brown v. Brown's Indus. Uniforms, Inc. (In re Brown's Indus.
Uniforms), 58 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. N.D. IlL., 1985) (pledge of personal finances); In re Landau
Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (combination of cash and loan
commitments); Buffalo Says. Bank v. Marston Enters. (In re Marston Enters.), 13 Bankr. 514
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (cash). See generally Baird & Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and
the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 738, 741 (1988) ("m[To the
extent that the junior owners can offer new supplies, expertise, or capital on terms more
favorable than anyone else, it is in everyone's interest that they do so.").
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4. Common Disaster Explanations for Reorganization
The persistent bias towards bankruptcy sharing revealed in Lionel, in the
Eighth Circuit's opinion in Ahlers, and in the structural rules of Chapter 11
can, at least in theory, be justified by the expanded creditors' bargain. One
justification for Chapter 11 distribution is diversification by risk sharing.
For common risks, risk-averse parties would prefer to diversify. As we have
seen, one method of accomplishing this is to split and share. Sharing
reduces both uncertainty and self-interested behavior. It is a desirable strat-
egy whenever individual risk bearing would be unproductive. As before,
given the costs of deciding whether insolvency resulted from a risk that had
been individually allocated or from a risk that was to be shared equally,
some partial blurring of entitlements may be a crude but effective response to
the general problem.
A second explanation for the peculiar structure of Chapter 11 and its judi-
cial gloss rests on the assumption of firm-specific investment. The expanded
creditors' bargain assumes that the owner-manager of a closely held firm
frequently has sentimental or idiosyncratic value invested in the enterprise.
Chapter 11 thus functions as a kind of rehabilitation insurance, a bargained-
for safeguard against the loss of idiosyncratic value. This conception
appears to explain why bankruptcy courts recognize equity's exclusive right
to invoke the contribution rule."°° Contribution is a peculiarly appropriate
method for "relational" firms to insure against the nonpecuniary losses asso-
ciated with dissolution.
A survey of contribution cases reveals patterns that are roughly congruent
with this expanded conception of the hypothetical bargain. The contribution
rule is generally invoked in proceedings to reorganize small, closely held
firms. Businesses whose contribution-based reorganization proposals have
been confirmed range from a small building supply company to a uniform
shop. 101
In re Landau Boat Co."02 is illustrative of how courts have applied the
contribution rule. The debtor's original reorganization plan was rejected
because the proposal would have permitted equity to retain its interest with-
out fully compensating unsecured creditors. The new plan then based the
retention of equity on contribution by "subscribers" who would receive one
share of stock in the reorganized firm for each dollar of contribution. The
subscribers were also required to loan the firm $3 per share of stock. The
100 Actually, contribution should probably be the manager's exclusive right. In a closely
held firm, however, the overlap may be substantial enough.
101 See, e.g., Potter Material Servm, 781 F.2d. at 99; Brown's Indu Uniforms, 58 Bankr. at
139; D. Skeel, supra note 92, at 7 n.23.
102 13 Bankr. 788.
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bankruptcy court confirmed the plan over the objections of secured and
unsecured creditors.
10 3
The plan in Landau Boat clearly had a distributional effect, as evidenced
by the creditors' objections. Nevertheless, the court approved the plan.
Contribution was the only feasible means of reorganizing the cash-starved
enterprise. The lesson is plain: when the debtor lacks needed cash, and
equity is willing to provide it, courts will tend to approve the plan in order to
facilitate reorganization, despite any distributional effects."
D. The Implementation Costs of Bankruptcy Sharing
The preceding discussion shows that the common disaster conceptualiza-
tion provides a richer and more textured framework for the ex ante bargain.
Because the expanded model seems to rationalize many of the distributional
effects of bankruptcy, it has both positive and normative appeal. This richer
version of the hypothetical bargain supports a key theoretical claim: ex post
redistribution is not necessarily incompatible with the ex ante objective of
maximizing the value of the firm. In the case of the trustee's collection pow-
ers, the redistribution may restrain eve of bankruptcy misbehavior by those
creditors who exercise de facto control over the debtor firm. Similarly, the
impulse to impose delay costs on secured creditors may be a means of imple-
menting a prearranged sharing scheme between secured and unsecured cred-
itors, a scheme that would reduce risk for those interactive contingencies not
subject to individual control. Chapter 11 reorganization imposes similar
delay costs on secured creditors, but introduces an additional factor: a distri-
bution to equity claimants that serves to promote reorganizations. This, in
turn, may be a form of antidissolution insurance for those debtors who have
made difficult-to-value investments in the firm.
Each of these effects imposes costs on secured creditors, who, in turn, pass
the costs on to future debtors. But the model provides some basis for argu-
ing that in each case the costs would be assumed willingly by the other par-
ticipants in the creditors' bargain. Thus far, however, we have assumed that
all of the benefits from bankruptcy sharing can be implemented automati-
cally in the bankruptcy process. In order to evaluate these effects in a more
realistic environment, we now relax the assumption of perfect implementa-
tion and examine the various practical impediments to any bankruptcy shar-
ing arrangement.
103 Id. at 794. The fact that the new contributions were not limited to the old equity owners
reduces the force of the creditors' objection to the plan.
104 D. Skeel, supra note 92, at 30.
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1. Beyond Forum Shopping
The problem of forum shopping confronts any bankruptcy system that is
designed to complement an existing system of state law priorities. Different
schemes for distributing entitlements will necessarily create perverse incen-
tives that motivate parties to use the bankruptcy process strategically. 0 5
Unsecured creditors and debtors will opt for bankruptcy, if they can, when
their share of the bankruptcy estate exceeds the value of their entitlements
under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Secured creditors, on the other hand,
will prefer to stay outside of bankruptcy if they are deprived in bankruptcy
of otherwise existing entitlements. Parties will maneuver strategically to
obtain the most favorable outcome, thus generating unnecessary social costs.
Maintaining uniformity between state law and federal bankruptcy law could
alleviate these problems.
The point is an important one, but if it is used to prove too much, it proves
nothing. Indeed, the problem of perverse incentives is built into the very
conception of the creditors' bargain. The-central feature of any ex ante bar-
gain is maximizing total creditor wealth through collectivization. Yet, by
restraining individual actions that are entirely permissible under state law,
collectivization necessarily generates perverse incentives and encourages
forum shopping.1 "6 The question, then, is whether the inevitable costs of
collectivization are justified by their corresponding benefits. On these terms,
the common disaster formulation is analytically indistinguishable from the
simple creditors' bargain conception. Both suggest an ex ante agreement to
accept the irreducible costs of forum shopping to the extent that they
purchase correspondingly greater expected benefits.
2. Problems of Strategic Manipulation
The problem of strategic manipulation of the bankruptcy process is cen-
tral to the normative choice between the two visions of bankruptcy. There
are two arguments that suggest that the expected costs of implementing
some or all of the agenda of the expanded bargain would be so great as to
justify a collective decision to abandon some or all of the risk-sharing goals.
First, incorporating any of the approved distributions-whether risk sharing
for diversification, contribution, or rehabilitation insurance-may generate
105 Bankruptcy is thus different from the usual solution to collective action problems. In
fields such as oil and gas, the collective solution is exclusive. Bankruptcy law is relatively
unique in having a solution to a collective action problem that is "optional," in that it runs
parallel to an existing set of noncollective, debt-collection rules.
106 These problems are reflected in the difficulties in generating a set of rules for determining
when bankruptcy is appropriate. The common sense notion is that bankruptcy usually occurs
too late, rather than too early, because of strategic self-selection, usually by equity owners.
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uncertainties that are qualitatively more costly than those associated with
collectivization itself. Second, some or all of the sharing rules may present
acute screening problems that jeopardize any corresponding benefits.
a. Uncertainty Costs
Distributional principles of any kind are inherently more difficult to
implement than are allocational principles. The failure of the bankruptcy
process to specify clearly drawn distributional rules that embody the equal-
ity and rehabilitative norms of bankruptcy is at least in part attributable to
an essentially technological problem. Because distributional principles
require an ex post analysis, they are not readily susceptible to ex ante
rulemaking. As a consequence, even those principles that emerge from the
ex ante bargain will generate additional uncertainties as to how entitlements
will be distributed in bankruptcy.
Uncertainty as to legal outcomes imposes several different kinds of costs.
Uncertainty may contribute to wasteful or excessive precautionary behavior.
For example, when a secured creditor is uncertain about the discount rate
that will be established in a section 1129(b) action, it will charge in advance
a premium reflecting the maximum possible delay costs that are anticipated.
This excessive precautionary behavior is inefficient in the sense that if the
parties could better predict the legal rule, they would be able to reach mutu-
ally beneficial agreements to reduce the risk.1 "7 Furthermore, some claim-
ants in the bankruptcy process may be risk averse. Regardless of whether
the parties self-insure or obtain third-party insurance, uncertainty cost is a
dead weight social loss for risk-averse parties.
The important question, then, is whether the incorporation of distribu-
tional effects generates uncertainties of a magnitude different from those pro-
duced by collectivization alone. This is an empirical question, but it does
suggest a distinction between the effects of across-the-board redistributions
and other bankruptcy sharing rules. Across-the-board provisions, such as
the denial of postpetition interest sanctioned by Timbers, are confined by
their explicit terms, and in that sense have a fixed and clearly defined
jurisdiction.
The same cannot be said, however, for the occasional distributional
impulses that appear throughout the bankruptcy process. The ad hoc bleed-
ing of secured creditors, especially in Chapter 11 reorganizations, has no
confining principle. It is neither mandated by, nor controlled by, the Bank-.
ruptcy Code. For instance, the adoption by some courts of discount rates at
107 See C. Goetz, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics, 292-303 (1984); Calfee &
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev.
965 (1984).
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less than current market values seems directly inconsistent with the statu-
tory injunction that secured creditors are entitled to receive deferred cash
payments "totaling at least" the present value of their secured claims.108 In
short, the occasional distributional effects that result from a judicial gloss on
the Bankruptcy Code, or that derive from the inherent uncertainties in valu-
ation of assets, impose a significantly greater uncertainty cost on the bank-
ruptcy process.
b. Screening Costs
Another unique cost of bankruptcy sharing derives from the distinction
between desirable and undesirable distributions. If only certain distributions
would be desirable in an ex ante bargain, failing to screen for those effects
would impose costs that are not likewise imposed in a simple collectivization
process. The problem of screening errors can be illustrated by a more care-
ful examination of the contribution rule and the Ahlers case. Initially, Ahlers
appears to fit the pattern of many of the cases confirming contribution-based
plans. In theory, the contribution of future services by an owner-manager is
justifiable as one means of effecting a rehabilitation insurance scheme. This
is especially true for activities such as farming, where the assumption of idio-
syncratic value is quite plausible, and cash contributions are not feasible.
The case for contribution in Ahlers does not survive close scrutiny, however.
In order to justify the use of the contribution rule to effect rehabilitation
insurance, the rule must operate as an effective screen. Reorganizations
where contribution is appropriate must be distinguished from those in which
the rule should not be invoked.109
But screening for the right distributions is not easily done. Attempts to
screen for types of cases that belong in bankruptcy are necessarily crude.
Moreover, even if an entity appropriately belongs in bankruptcy, the desira-
bility of a particular sharing rule turns on the type of risk or on the status of
the owner-manager. Again, screening among cases is likely to be difficult
and perhaps biased. The contribution doctrine, for example, has never been
codified. Thus, the language of the statute provides nothing to assist in the
contribution analysis. Given the uncertainties generated by the contribution
rule, courts must rely on their own impressionistic judgments as to whether
a proposed contribution is consistent with the Code's objectives.
Even if we ignore our suspicion (bolstered by cognitive processes such as
"presence") that courts strain to facilitate the reorganization of "attractive"
debtors, it must be conceded that courts have few guidelines for implement-
ing the contribution rule that will safely distinguish "deserving" debtors
108 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1982).
109 D. Skeel, supra note 92, at 31-32.
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from those who are not.110 In Ahlers, for example, the only basis for bank-
ruptcy intervention would be to preserve the Ahlers' idiosyncratic invest-
ment. But since there were only two principal parties, they should have
negotiated a sharing rule independently of bankruptcy. To explain why they
did not, one has to argue either that the parties anticipated significant multi-
ple creditors (unlikely under the facts of Ahlers) or that they were satisfied
with bankruptcy's sharing rule (unlikely because, before the Eighth Circuit
opinion in Ahlers, it would have been extremely difficult to predict the rule).
In short, the rule the Eighth Circuit embraced in Ahlers ran a significant risk
of implementing neither the simple nor the expanded creditors' bargain
model of bankruptcy.11
Our earlier discussion of risk-bearing strategies illustrates the undesirable
effects of an ineffective screen. Parties who would be willing to pay the
added cost to share common risks presumably would prefer not to pay to
share those risks that can be reduced by individual precautions. Screening
failures force claimants to pay for more bankruptcy sharing than they would
have agreed to in the original creditors' bargain. Secured creditors, having
borne the burden of redistribution that results when courts misapply a shar-
ing rule, will pass this cost on to future debtors. Those debtors who must
rely on private credit for their financing needs are often small, capital-poor
firms. Frequently, they have no alternative but to pay the inflated cost of
credit.
Screening errors also have important feedback effects on the uncertainty
costs described above. If the extent of the redistribution from secured credi-
tor to equity claimants cannot be accurately predicted, secured creditors will
be motivated to avoid bankruptcy altogether and to seek alternatives such as
private workouts and state insolvency proceedings. Furthermore, each
claimant in bankruptcy will engage in costly efforts to minimize its individ-
ual contribution to the bankruptcy sharing. This strategic maneuvering is a
form of rent-seeking behavior that erodes the gains from collectivization.
To the extent that the inability to screen for the desired distributions is
systematic, courts will tend invariably to misapply those bankruptcy rules
that are designed, whether deliberately or through inadvertence, to advance
the desired distributional goals. This concern for excessive screening errors
110 Id. at 31-33.
111 At least in result, the reversal of Ahlers by the Supreme Court, see Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963,
supports this view. The same criticism might be true of Timbers, 108 S. Ct. 626. See supra
text accompanying note 69. Timbers is also a two-party case with no applicable going concern
surplus. In Timbers, however, it might plausibly be asserted that the parties had implicitly
agreed to bankruptcy's risk-sharing rule, in the form of no compensation for time value. This
distinction may explain why the Supreme Court affirmed the result in Timbers but reversed
Ahlers.
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provides a further point of distinction between broad-based and ad hoe dis-
tributional effects. The uncertainty with respect to cases such as Ahlers is
symptomatic of the underlying uncertainty generated by any ad hoc distribu-
tional principle. The enhanced costs of implementing bankruptcy sharing
rules, even where those rules might in theory be part of the ex ante bargain,
threaten the very wealth maximization goals that drive the bargain itself.
III. CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The preceding analysis suggests that substantial difficulties will attend
attempts to accommodate maximization and distributional goals in bank-
ruptcy. Several key normative implications follow from this analysis. First,
these operational problems should not obscure the fact that a single-minded
focus on preserving the value of prebankruptcy entitlements is not necessar-
ily the optimal means of mirroring a hypothetical ex ante bargain among the
creditors. The expanded bargain model offers instead an alternative bench-
mark for evaluating the goals of the current bankruptcy system. Our model
suggests that various distributional objectives shape the bankruptcy process
and that these objectives are entirely congruent with the goal of maximizing
expected group welfare. The inefficiencies that we observe in bankruptcy
may simply be a classic example of the "before and after" problem: the result
of defective implementation of theoretically desirable objectives.
The central challenge, therefore, is to devise bankruptcy rules that better
reflect both maximization and distributional norms. At this level, the analy-
sis offers specific prescriptive guidance as well. Rules that attempt to redis-
tribute bankruptcy assets in particular cases are peculiarly susceptible to
exploitation. Case-by-case analyses simply do not screen effectively between
desired and disfavored redistributions. Instead these ad hoc distributions
motivate the wasteful rent seeking behavior we have described above.
A preferable strategy for achieving bankruptcy's distributional goals
would be to visualize the various distributional effects as a kind of "bank-
ruptcy tax." If the distributional tax is certain and fixed, the parties have the
capacity to adjust to the distributional rules. Furthermore, the more the tax
is made certain and horizontally equitable, the less individual parties will be
motivated to escape their share of the distributional burden. This suggests
that across-the-board redistributions, such as the Timbers denial of postpeti-
tion interest for secured creditors, are preferable to the individualized distri-
butional policies reflected in the Eighth Circuit's decision in Ahlers.
The extreme difficulty of crafting effective individualized distribution rules
may also resolve a final puzzle suggested by the creditors' bargain conceptu-
alization. If the bankruptcy process is best understood as the implementa-
tion of a consensual bargain among all affected groups, what then explains
the mandatory character of the distributional scheme? For example, sup-
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pose that the common disaster risk sharing is, in fact, the outcome preferred
by most creditors. Assume, however, that an individual secured creditor
announces in advance that it does not intend to participate in bankruptcy
sharing. The creditor instead offers a price discount for the credit it will
issue. Under current bankruptcy law, such contracting out would not be
permissible. One explanation for the mandatory nature of the current bank-
ruptcy system derives from the technological difficulty of crafting rules that
accomplish both collectivization and distributional objectives. These opera-
tional constraints offer some justification for limitations on the traditional
freedom to contract out.
The benefits of standardized distributional rules suggest that the tradi-
tional contractual freedom to opt out of the creditors bargain might sensibly
be restricted in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law is neither a pure contractarian
nor a strictly regulatory legal regime. Rather, bankruptcy law limits individ-
ual choice to a few model forms (shareholders, secured creditors, unsecured
creditors), each having been tested by time and experience and thus carrying
a reputable "brand name."' 12 These various options, and their associated
legal entitlements, have evolved over time. The priorities have been tested,
and rules fixing the distribution have been ado~ted into positive law. 1 3
To be sure, limiting options to only a few model forms imposes costs on
those parties for whom the available options are ill-fitting and to whom a
tailor-made alternative would be preferable. The justification for this limita-
tion is that, in the bankruptcy setting, the extraordinary benefits of standard-
ization of distributional rules seem to trump the benefits of contractual
freedom for idiosyncratic participants in the process." 4
Where this all leads remains, predictably, an empirical question. In the-
ory, incorporating a common disaster perspective into the creditors' bargain
approach offers a richer vision of the bankruptcy process because it rational-
izes some of the distributional impulses that are unambiguously present in
bankruptcy. Unhappily, the model also reveals the significant strains that
bankruptcy sharing imposes on the bankruptcy process. Thus, the analysis,
while providing a more precise focus for the arguments, ultimately leaves
unresolved the ongoing normative debate concerning the proper role for
bankruptcy in the resolution of creditor claims.
We have suggested that the distributional effects of bankruptcy are a
112 For an analysis of similar concerns in the corporate context, see Coffee, No Exit?
Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53
Brooklyn L. Rev. 919 (1988).
113 This discussion of evolution of standardized contract terms draws on the discussion in
Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261 (1985).
114 Id.
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bankruptcy tax imposed on the participants in the collective proceeding.115
To the extent that the tax revenues are used to support the welfare of the
claimants as a group, one can visualize the parties agreeing to so burden
themselves in an ex ante bargain. The further problem that the parties must
resolve, however, is that the bankruptcy distribution tax is not a purely exog-
enous cost that the parties can simply adjust to ex ante. Rather, the magni-
tude of any distributional tax is a function of the bankruptcy law. If the
rules for bankruptcy sharing were perfectly definable and enforceable, the
theoretical appeal of the common disaster heuristic could be fully realized.
Bankruptcy sharing rules that apply only in particular cases are necessarily
ambiguous, however, because they require an ex post evaluation of particu-
lar circumstances in order to trigger a contingent ex ante agreement to share.
Under those inherent constraints, claimants have an incentive to expend
resources to minimize the incidence of the bankruptcy tax on them as indi-
viduals, thus reducing the wealth of the claimants as a group. Furthermore,
bankruptcy proceedings such as Chapter 11, which are designed to accom-
plish these more complex goals, invite dissipation of the common pool by
specialists, lawyers, accountants, and economists, who are similarly moti-
vated to secure individual advantage at group expense.
115 See Goldberg, Comment: Economic Aspects of Bankruptcy Law, 141 J. Institutional &
Theoretical Econ. 99, 101-02 (1985).
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